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TOWARD COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN
ASYLUM LAW: REVIVING THE ERODING
RIGHT TO POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
"The life of the Law has not been logic: it has been experience."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881).
James M. Didden, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
An overwhelming number of asylum-seekers strains the most liberal
asylum laws.' In the United States, approximately 100,000 people
sought asylum in 1992.2 The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) reports that asylum-seekers filed 73,757 applications between
October 1993 and March 1994, bringing the total number of pending
cases during this period to 378,935.' In the Federal Republic of Germa-
* J.D. Candidate, May 1995, Washington College of Law. The American Uni-
versity; B.A., 1989, Boston College. I presented this Comment in March 1993 at the
Program for the Study of Germany and Europe, Minda de Gunzburg Center for Euro-
pean Studies, Harvard University. I remain indebted to the participants at Harvard
University for their comments and criticisms on earlier drafts. I thank my wife. Dawn
Marmo, for her editorial assistance and moral support throughout this endeavor. I
also thank Philip H. Oettinger for his steadfast guidance and commentary.
1. See 117 CONG. REc. S9,993 (daily ed. July 30, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (arguing that the most important aspect of new asylum legislation is to
establish mechanisms to prevent abuse of the asylum system).
2. See Motel Kaflca. N.Y. NEWSDAY. Oct. 24, 1993. at 25 (reporting the number
of asylum-seekers in the United States during 1992).
3. See INS Statistical Report, Asylum Division (April 22. 1994) (reporting the
number of asylum applications filed and pending between October 1993 and March
1994). During this same period, the INS granted 3,441 applications, denied 14,801
applications, and closed 4,992 applications. Id.
80 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ny,4 approximately 440,000 asylum-seekers filed claims in 1992.- Dur-
ing the first four months of 1993, 161,324 new asylum applicants regis-
tered-a thirty percent increase from the same period in 1992.6
Today, more than ever before, a worldwide refugee epidemic compels
the attention and action of the international community.' Although many
theorists dream of freeing asylum law from the political influences and
procedural chaos that historically have plagued it,' the fruition of this
dream remains distant at best.' Reality, meanwhile, compels states to
adopt more practical and realistic approaches to the refugee problem.'"
4. The author hereinafter refers to the Federal Republic of Germany as Germa-
ny.
5. See infra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the dramatic increase
in German asylum claims).
6. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the percentage increase
in asylum claims during 1993).
7. See, e.g., Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Statement to the Third Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations
(Nov. 10, 1992) (stating that at a minimum, eighteen million refugees exist around
the world); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNCERTAIN HAVEN: REFUGEE
PROTECTION ON THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1951 UNITED STATES REFUGEE
CONVENTION 3 (1991) (noting, in addition to refugees, the existence of approximately
thirty-five million internally displaced persons).
8. See generally Deborah Anker & Michael Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981) [hereinafter
Forty Year Crisis] (arguing for depoliticizing the asylum process and for the special
training of those who process asylum claims); Ira Kurzban, Restructuring the Asylum
Process, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 91 (1981) (calling for the elimination of the State
Department and more lenient time restrictions in the asylum process); Arthur C.
Helton, Political Asylum Under the Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 243 (1984) [hereinafter Unfulfilled Promise] (criticizing the procedural mech-
anisms for processing asylum claims); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France: Lessons For the United
States, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 183 (1984) [hereinafter Political Asylum] (suggesting
that the United States should examine Germany's and the Republic of France's asy-
lum laws when revamping its own politicized system of processing asylum claims).
9. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Con-
stitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862 (1989); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact
and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 11 (1985); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 255; Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation
of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984); David Martin, Due Process and
Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L.
REv. 165 (1983) (discussing the due process rights of refugees under the United
States Constitution).
10. See Sam Blay & Andreas Zimmerman, Recent Changes in German Refugee
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As the United States and Germany narrow the scope of asylum rights,"
the international community must either share more of the burden, or
witness the deterioration of the right to asylum.
This Comment examines the proposed changes in United States asy-
lum law and the changes recently agreed to in Germany. 2 Part I traces
the evolution of asylum law in the United States. Part II addresses re-
cent proposals before the United States Congress to amend existing
asylum law. Part I examines Germany's approach to processing asylum
claims in order to chronicle the development of its asylum law. To un-
derstand Germany's reasons for amending its asylum law, Part IV docu-
ments its staggering number of asylum-seekers. Part V recounts the
political struggle to change the German asylum law and describes the
influence of right wing radicalism on this debate. Part VI discusses the
recent amendment to the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) governing
asylum, and, the related agreements entered into with other European
countries. Part VII recommends a system of collective responsibility that
would globalize the burden sharing of this worldwide epidemic. In con-
clusion, this Comment urges the United States, Germany, and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to take the initia-
tive in halting the erosion of the right to asylum.
I. POLITICAL ASYLUM LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
A. HISTORY
Prior to 1968, United States asylum law was a generous program of
ad hoc responses to migratory situations. During this period, refugees
could obtain asylum in the United States by three methods: (i) withhold-
ing of deportation;'4 (ii) conditional entry status;'5 and (iii) the parole
Lav: A Critical Assessment. 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 361, 365 (1994) ("[Tlhe practice of
sending refugees back to countries of first refuge has become a rather common fea-
ture of refugee law in many states.").
11. See infra notes 48-92. 145-75 and accompanying text (documenting the ways
in which the United States and Germany are altering their asylum laws to limit the
number of asylum-seekers their systems process).
12. See infra notes 48-92 and 145-75 (describing changes in United States and
German asylum laws).
13. See The Displaced Persons Act. Pub. L No. 80-774. 62 Stat. 1009 (1948):
The Displaced Persons Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555. 64 Stat. 219
(1959) (addressing migration in World War II aftermath); H.R. Rep. No. 581. 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1949) (allowing political dissidents to enter from communist'
countries).
14. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. § 243(h), 614.226 Stat. 163.
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power of the Attorney General. 6 Withholding of deportation, as the
name suggests, allowed the Attorney General 7 to withhold the deporta-
tion of refugees to any country where it was "clearly probable" that
they would experience physical persecution. 8 Conditional entry status,
which concerned the admission of refugees from overseas, allowed the
INS to admit aliens who could demonstrate that they had fled either a
Middle Eastern country or a communist country. 9 Finally, the Attorney
General exercised parole power for emergency or public interest rea-
sons.
20
In 1968, the United States became a party to the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.2' One of the 1967
214 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)) [hereinafter 1952
Act] (authorizing the Attorney General to withhold the deportation of Iny alien who
might experience persecution). This withholding provision had, however, geographic
and ideological limitations. Id.
15. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 1965 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
§ 11, 79 Stat. 911, 918 (1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982))
[hereinafter 1965 Amendments] (replacing the requirement that an alien demonstrate
that he or she would be subject to "physical persecution" with a standard of persecu-
tion based on "race, religion or political opinion"). Conditional entry status was sub-
ject to numerical limitations. Id.
16. See 1952 Act, supra note 14, at § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 188 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § l182(d)(5)(A) (1982)) (granting the Attorney General the au-
thority to parole aliens into the country for emergency or public interest reasons).
Although the statute did not impose geographic, ideological, or numerical limitations
on this parole power, Attorneys General used it almost exclusively to admit persons
fleeing from communist states. See Unfidfilled Promise, supra note 8, at 246-48 (doc-
umenting the evolution of asylum law in the United States).
17. The Attorney General heads the Department of Justice. A unit of this Depart-
ment, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), has primary responsibility for
enforcing immigration laws. Within the INS, the Executive Office of Immigration
Review (EOIR) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) handle administrative
appeals. See infra note 30 (describing the administrative apparatus that enforces United
States immigration law).
18. See 1952 Act, supra note 14, at § 243(h), 666 Stat. 163, 214 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)) (delineating the requirements for withholding of de-
portation).
19. See 1965 Amendments, supra note 15, at § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 913) (repealed at
94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980)) (setting out the requirements for conditional entry status).
20. See 1952 Act, supra note 14, at § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 188) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982)) (specifying the parole power of the
Attorney General).
21. See The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967
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Protocol's central provisions was its definition of a "refugee" as a per-
son who feared persecution "for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."' Al-
though the drafters of the 1967 Protocol intended this ideologically
neutral definition of a refugee to expand both the use of the Attorney
General's parole power and the withholding of deportation,' the United
States subsequent implementation of this definition, as statistics dem-
onstrate, was far from effective in this regard. - For example, from
1968-1980 the Attorney General exercised its parole power to retain
608,365 persons from communist nations and only 7,150 persons from
non-communist nations.' In addition, although the Attorney General's
Protocol] (establishing global standards for treatment of refugees). By acceding to the
1967 Protocol, the United States also became a party to the United Nations Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees. opened for signature July 28. 1951. 19
U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention], that
imposes upon states the duty of non-refoulemient, or non-return, of political refugees.
See id. at art. 33 (describing non-refoulement as a duty of contracting parties not to
deport a refugee to territories where his or her race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group, or political opinion will jeopardize his or her life): see
also Karen Parker and Lyn Beth Neylon. Jus Cogens: Compelling the Lm, of Human
Rights, 12 HAsTINGs INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 411, 435-36 (1989) [hereinafter Human
Rights] (discussing non-refoulenient as a ins cogens norm that imposes an obligation
on all states not to deport refugees back to countries at war): UNHCR, Annual Re-
port to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. GAOR. 40th Sess.. Supp. No. 12. at 6.
U.N. Doc. A/40/12 (1985) (stating that the non-refoulement norm prohibits a refugee's
deportation to a country at war regardless of whether the refugee satisfies the ele-
ments of the 1951 Convention definition): Harold Hongju Koh. Reflections on
Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1994) (noting that
during the early 1980s, the Department of Justice took the position that Article 33 of
the 1951 Convention applied extraterritorially).
22. See 1967 Protocol. supra note 21. at art. I. § 2: 1951 Convention. supra
note 21, at art. 1, § A(2) (defining a refugee).
23. See Unfifilled Promise, supra note 8, at 251 (stating that the drafters created
the new refugee standard to assist in determining claims for asylum and claims of
withholding). As the 1980 Refugee Act eliminated conditional entry, discussion of this
provision ends subsequent to 1980. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (de-
scribing the 1980 Refugee Act).
24. See Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 8. at 246-50 (discussing the United
States' failure to implement effectively the provisions of the 1967 Protocol during the
years 1968-1980).
25. See World Refugee Crisis: The hIternational Community's Response. Report to
the Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.. 1st Sess. 213 (1979) (describing the
retention of persons from communist countries under the Attorney General's parole
power).
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broad discretion in decisions on the withholding of deportation could
have accommodated the new definition of "refugee," the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA) continued to use the more stringent clear proba-
bility standard.26 Moreover, the courts reviewing withholding of depor-
tation cases failed to reach a clear consensus on the appropriate refugee
eligibility standard. 7 These inconsistencies fueled the debates that led
to the Refugee Act of 1980.28
B. RECENT INCONSISTENCIES
The Refugee Act of 198029 marked a turning point in asylum law,
creating a uniform system"0 under which the United States could con-
26. See Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 8, at 247 (discussing the Attorney
General's and the Board of Immigration Appeal's retention of the clear probability
standard); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987) (stating that
the clear probability standard is higher than that the United States requires for a grant
of asylum, because it requires objective evidence that demonstrates that it is more
likely than not that an alien will experience persecution if deported to his or her
native country).
27. See Unfldfilled Promise, supra note 8, at 247 (stating that after the imple-
mentation of the 1967 Protocol, some reviewing courts applied the clear probability
standard, others applied the well-grounded fear standard, and still others applied an
assortment of hybrid standards).
28. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Refugee Act of
1980).
29. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C., and at 22 U.S.C. § 2601) (1990)) (establishing a nonideological,
uniform basis for determining a refugee's eligibility to remain in the United States).
30. See Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A
Case Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory
Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 439-43 (1992) [hereinafter
Legal Nonns] (discussing the two groups of asylum application procedures for aliens
present in the United States). First, prior to the initiation of exclusion or deportation
hearings, applicants file claims with the INS. Id. Aliens who enter without INS in-
spection or those in the country on expired nonimmigrant visas who affirmatively
request asylum fall into this category. Under this procedure, asylum officers conduct
an "unrecorded, non-adversarial interview." Id. at 441 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.9
(1992)). Second, after the government initiates exclusion or deportation hearings, appli-
cants file with the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR). Id. (citing 8
C.F.R. § 3.0 (1992)). This procedure requires a "formal administrative hearing" that
an immigration judge conducts. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.10 (1992)). This judge may
examine the alien and any witnesses. Id. at 442, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (Supp.
1992). The hearing allows the immigration judge to receive a "broad" range of evi-
dence relevant to any issue in the case. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(c) (1992)). The
immigration judge renders his or her opinion "based on recorded evidence." Id. (citing
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sider claims of asylum3' and claims for withholding of deportation.'
The United States intended this Act to enforce domestically its commit-
ment to international, humanitarian traditions.33 The Act included a def-
inition of refugee consistent with the 1967 Protocol as one of its prima-
ry provisions.'
Yet many of the procedural hardships that occurred after implementa-
tion of the 1967 Protocol also characterize the period following the
Refugee Act of 1980.' First, there remain inconsistencies between the
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (Supp. 1992)). An applicant "has the right to" counsel during an
EOIR proceeding. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(l)-(4) (Supp. 1992)). The applicant
and the government may "appeal a decision to the BIA," which is an "administrative
appellate unit within the EOIR." let at 443 (citing 8 C.F.I. § 3.1 (1992)). Applicants
"can further appeal to a federal district court or a circuit court of appeals." Id. (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (Supp. 1992)).
The government promulgated changes to the 1980 interpretation of the refugee
definition in 1990. Id. at 440 n.17 (citing 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (Supp. 1992)).
Although it is preferable for asylum officers to receive an advisory opinion from the
State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA). they
may issue a final decision without an advisory opinion "if at least 60 days have
elapsed since the request." Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 298.11(b) (1992)). The United States
further authorizes asylum officers to consider evidence "credible sources other than the
State Department" provide. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (1992)). An applicant need
not establish that he or she would experience persecution if he or she can establish a
"pattern" of persecution of "persons similarly situated." Id. at 441 (citing 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(2)(i)(A) (1992)).
31. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982) [here-
inafter INA].
32. INA § 243, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
33. See Forty Year Crisis, supra note 8. at 64-89 (stating that the purpose of the
1980 Refugee Act was to implement international standards, and thus eliminate the
use of selection criteria based on geographic considerations, foreign policy, and coun-
try of origin); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFicE, ASYLuti: APPROVAL RATES FOR SE-
LECTED APPLICANTS (1987) (examining the selection criteria the United States uses in
asylum processing); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASYLt.TI: UNIFORM APPLICA-
TION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN-FEW DENIED APPLICANTS DEPORTED 8 (1987) (dis-
cussing uniformity within the asylum structure); see also Unfufilled Promise. supra
note 8, at 250 (discussing the policy behind the 1980 Refugee Act).
34. See 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (Supp 1992) (promulgating the "well-founded
fear" definition of refugee consistent with the 1967 Protocol). A noticeable difference
between the treaty and United States statutory provisions, however, is that the statute
explicitly includes those who suffered past persecution, independent of determining the
possibility of future persecution. Il See also 8 C.F.R. § 208 13(b)(1)(ii) (1994) (dem-
onstrating that a showing of past persecution is sufficient to sustain an asylum claim
unless no compelling humanitarian factors are present or future persecution is unlike-
ly).
35. See generally Robert Koulish, Systemaric Deterrence Against Prospective As.-
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refugee standards that immigration authorities and courts actually apply
and the international principles the United States charges them with up-
holding.36 Second, the United States continues for ideological reasons to
grant asylum to a disproportionately greater number of applicants from
countries unfriendly to the United States.37 Third, bureaucratic ineffi-
luin Seekers: A Study of the South Texas hinigration District, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 529 (1992) (stating that the EOIR and INS system in South Texas is
geared toward deterring applicants and not toward fair adjudication of asylum determi-
nations). The asylum interviews impose difficult-to-satisfy "corroboration" requirements,
fail to consider the applicant's "subjective fear," and provide "poor foreign language
interpretation." Id. at 549. Lack of counsel for the applicant often impacts asylum
decisions. Id. at 547. See also THE RECORDER, Jan. 30, 1991, at I (conducting a
survey of the San Francisco immigration court's practices). Although observers consid-
er the San Francisco immigration court one of the most benevolent toward illegal
immigrants, with an asylum grant rate as high as thirty-nine percent in 1989, contra-
dictions, arbitrariness, and loopholes characterize the system. Id. at 7.
36. See Legal Norms, supra note 30, at 447 (stating that a "significant disparity"
remains between the asylum law Congress enacts and the asylum law officials prac-
tice). The current process fails to satisfy the Congressional intent to "supply fair and
uniform methods" of asylum adjudication. Id. "Bureaucratic inefficiencies" often delay
reaching final decisions on cases. Id. During an eighteen-month period, the EOIR
court granted seven asylum applications using "no coherent legal doctrine" or "consis-
tent application" of the law. Id. at 452. Many of the applications the immigration
court granted it approved "on the basis of theories rejected in other cases." Id. As
government attorneys were not likely to appeal asylum decisions and "the EOIR does
not make immigration judges' decisions publicly available . . . cases and theories
which supported a grant of asylum" the process effectively buried. Id. See also Abra-
ham D. Sofaer, Judicial Control of hIformal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforce-
ment, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1316-48 (1972) (emphasizing the paradoxical devel-
opment of two systems of asylum law, one that is written and entirely unfavorable to
applicants, and another that is unwritten and entirely favorable to applicants).
37. See Legal Norms, supra note 30. at 447 (insisting that current asylum proce-
dures perpetuate ideological preferences). For example, although proof existed concern-
ing political violence in Haiti, El Salvador, and Guatemala during an eighteen-month
period, an immigration court did not award asylum to any Haitians or Guatemalans
and awarded asylum to only one Salvadoran. Id. at 455. Contrary to Congressional
intent, cultural factors, social class, and "the adjudicator's perception of the applicant's
ideological beliefs" substantially influence those cases the government approves for
asylum. Id. at 454. Applicants who succeed in obtaining asylum tend to be well-edu-
cated, are able to produce corroborative evidence, and have the benefit of experienced
counsel. Id. Exaggerated burdens of proof contribute to these inconsistent standards.
Id. at 448. Adjudicators often apply a "clear likelihood" standard instead of the "rea-
sonable possibility" test international standards and the Supreme Court's decision in
Cardoza-Fonseca require. Id. See supra note 26 (discussing the Cardoza-Fonseca deci-
sion). Although the "reasonable possibility" standard emphasizes the relevance of asy-
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ciencies delay the processing of claims within the asylum system." The
United States interdiction program, which intercepts applicants at sea in
an attempt to deter their entry, highlights these political consider-
ations.39 The recent acceleration of United States interdiction efforts
illuminates the longstanding variance between international norms and
their domestic application.'
By failing to adhere to the universal duty of non-refoulement," the
lum-seekers' personal testimony and their subjective beliefs, immigration judges fre-
quently require substantiated proof of corroborative evidence. Legal Norms. supra note
30, at 448-49.
The State Department plays a major role in incorporating social, cultural, and
ideological factors into the asylum adjudication process. Id. A startling correlation
exists between the State Department's issuance of positive or negative advisory opin-
ions and the outcome of asylum cases. Id. Although the State Department rarely rec-
ommends granting an applicant asylum, such applicants almost always gain approval.
Id. See also Richard N. Preston, Asylumz Adjudications: Do State Department Advisory
Opinions Violate U.S. International Obligations?. 45 MD. L. REV. 91, 116-22 (1986)
(questioning the role of the State Department in asylum adjudication).
38. See Legal Norms, supra note 30, at 456 (stating that the INS conducts pro-
tracted cross-examinations and refuses to concede claims early in the process thereby
delaying resolution of meritorious claims). Among the many factors that stall the adju-
dication process, the EOIR's difficulty in furnishing transcripts for appeals has the
greatest derogatory impacL Id. at 457. Immigration judges often display bias, and may
impose restrictive evidentiary rules even though immigration courts have no rules of
evidence. Id. at 449-50. Inadequate foreign language interpretation is also a problem
for applicants. Id.
39. See Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 8. at 254-62 (describing the encroachment
of domestic policy on asylum law). The United States has implemented a deterrence
program of intercepting asylum-seekers on the high seas. imprisoning them upon arriv-
al, and often denying them a fair opportunity to present their claims. See Howard W.
French, U.S. Is Holding 200 Haitians on 2 Ships, N.Y. TtMES. Nov. 8. 1991. at A3
(noting that during the decade following the beginning of the Haitian interdiction
program, the United States intercepted 23.000 Haitians and brought only twenty-eight
to shore to apply for asylum); Islands of Inequality, WASH. POST, Nov. 4. 1992, at
A18 (stating that the United, States Coast Guard intercepted over 38.00 Haitian boat
people in an eight-month period after President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's September
1991 ouster).
40. See, e.g., Arthur C. Helton, The United States Government Program of In-
tercepting and Forcibly Returning Haitian Boat People to Haiti: Policy Implications
and Prospects, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 325 (1993) [hereinafter Haitian Boat
People] (assessing the United States interdiction policy toward Haitian refugees): Koh.
supra note 21 (describing legal challenges to the interdiction policy).
41. See Koh, supra note 21 (arguing that the interdiction policy violates United
States obligations under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention). But see Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (holding that neither United States immigra-
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interdiction program fosters this disparate application in three ways.
First, interdiction revives the long-discredited view that a person's hu-
man rights depend upon geography by placing a geographic limit on a
non-refoulement mandate that the international community unanimously
accepts." Second, the United States policy toward Haitian refugees is
inconsistent with its position in prior consequential human rights con-
troversies. In the Nuremberg trials,43 for example, the United States
took the position that international law could sanction crimes against
humanity-including murder, deportation, and other political or racial
persecution-regardless of the law of the country where the crimes
occurred.' Finally, the United States interdiction policy of appre-
hending refugees at sea tacitly acknowledges the increased rights of
refugees once they reach shore. 5 Increasing public hostility to all forms
of immigration further politicizes United States immigration law and
policy and encourages non-compliance with international obligations.
Much of this hostility stems from the belief that immigrants contribute
disproportionately to crime and to welfare and education costs. 6
tion law nor international treaties prohibit the forced return of Haitians the United
States apprehends in international waters).
42. See Koh, supra note 21 (asserting that Congress did not intend to limit the
application of the non-refoulement obligation to United States territory); cf Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, (1856) (Campbell, J., concurring) (holding that the
fugitive slave clause of the Constitution provides for the return of escaping slaves
within the limits of the Union).
43. Charter of International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82
U.N.T.S. 279.
44. See Human Rights, supra note 21, at 435-46 (suggesting that the Nuremberg
trials fostered the notion that certain fundamental norms transcend the consent of
states); see also Baker Rejects Asian Criticism of U.S. Over Boat People, Reuters
Library Report, July 26, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (noting
that in criticizing the Asian nations' "push-backs" of Vietnamese boat people into the
sea, then Secretary of State James Baker stated that the United States deplored invol-
untary repatriation); Refugee Reports, vol. 9. no. 3 (Mar. 18, 1988) (reporting a letter
from the United States Ambassador to Thailand to that nation's foreign minister call-
ing for an end to "push-backs" of Laotian refugees); 135 CONG. REC. 6,354 (1989)
(noting that in 1989, the Senate passed Concurrent Resolution 26 urging first asylum
countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to reinstate the
practice of providing refugee assistance to all asylum-seekers and pointing out that
these nations should not consider the forced repatriation of refugees to Vietnam).
45. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1lth
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992) (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (stating that
the United States interdiction of Haitians at sea does not alleviate its moral obligation
to furnish a safe haven for those refugees).
46. See Roberto Suro, Study Boosts States' Bid for Greater Federal Burden in
1994] COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN ASYLUM LAW 89
II. CHANGES IN UNITED STATES POLITICAL ASYLUM LAW
In the 103d Congress, members introduced numerous bills seeking to
amend immigration law in general 7 and asylum law in particular."3
hnmigration Costs. WASH. POST, Sept. 15. 1994. at A3 (reporting an Urban Institute
study that calculated the annual cost of educating undocumented children at S3.1 bil-
lion and the cost of incarcerating undocumented criminals at $471 million, compared
to tax revenue of $1.9 billion); Marc Sandalow. Politicians Paqing Attention to Up-
roar Over hnImigration, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 31, 1994. at Al (stating that proposals to
restrict immigration respond to grass-roots anger over economic competition. welfare.
and crimes such as the World Trade Center bombing); John J. Miller. Immigrant-
Bashing's Latest Falsehood, WALL ST. J.. Mar. 8. 1994. at A16 (arguing that the
public falsely holds all immigrants responsible for the well-publicized crimes of a
few).
47. See Lizette Alvarez, Border Disorder is the Talk of Congress. Many Touting
Get-Tough Laws, MIAMI HERALD. Mar. 1. 1994. at IA (reporting that the 103d Con-
gress has introduced more than 150 immigration-related bills).
48. See, e.g., H.R. 3363, 103d Cong., 1st Sess..(1993) (amending the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 to reform the asylum law broadly by summarily exclud-
ing aliens arriving without valid documentation, increasing appropriations for the INS.
and improving immigration enforcement and anti-smuggling activities): H.R. 2602.
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (containing the same proposed reforms as H.R. 3363. as
the Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the House Judi-
ciary Committee approved); S. 1333, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introducing Presi-
dent Clinton's Expedited Exclusion and Alien Smuggling Enhanced Penalties Act of
1993, along with its companion bill. S. 2836. to prevent illegal entry into the United
States, to expedite procedures for the deportation and removal of excludable aliens
and felons, and to deter illegal entry and smuggling through increased sanctions and
criminal penalties); S. 1884. 103d Cong.. Ist Sess. (1994) (proposing asylum reform.
the disbursement and imposition of land border crossing fees. increased enforcement
and penalties for alien smuggling, and summary exclusion for asylum): S. 1358. 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing identical amendments to H.R. 3363): S. 1923. 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (containing comparable provisions to S. 1884): S. 1091. 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing to control international organized crime): H.R.
3860, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing provisions similar to H.R. 3363): S.
1348, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing to amend the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952 to reform the asylum law, to authorize appropriations for the INS.
and to increase penalties for alien smuggling). S. 1351. 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(proposing to protect American workers from unfair labor competition. to curb crimi-
nal activity by aliens, to defend against acts of international terrorism, and to relieve
the pressure on public services by strengthening border security and stabilizing immi-
gration into the United States); H.R. 3223. 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (authorizing
increased expenditures for immigration enforcement).
Health care and crime notwithstanding, the Clinton Administration has addressed
immigration and asylum issues. On March 30. 1994. the Clinton Administration pub-
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This legislation includes new provisions which, if the United States
implements, would have a significant impact on its asylum law.49 The
majority of these bills start from the premise that the rights of refugees
are greater once they reach United States territory, using this premise to
justify a policy of exclusion.50 To comprehend the magnitude of the
proposed changes, it is necessary to examine in detail this asylum legislation."
lished a proposed rule aimed at solving INS workload and staffing issues. 59 Fed.
Reg. 14,779 (1993). Under this rule, INS asylum officers would interview applicants
and grant asylum approval at their discretion, referring other cases to the EOIR immi-
gration judges. Id. at 14,786. This proposal also separates the asylum process from
procedures for issuing work authorizations. Id. at 14,784. The INS would not issue
work authorizations until 150 days after the alien files an asylum application. Id. at
14,785. Only if the INS or EOIR did not hear a case within 180 days would the
applicant automatically receive a work authorization. Id. The proposed rule would
require applicants to pay an unprecedented $60 fee for initial work authorization and
a $130 application fee. Id. at 14,784. See also Sandalow, supra note 46 (noting that
one purpose of the proposed regulations was to defuse legislative proposals to elimi-
nate asylum applicants' rights to a hearing).
49. See Haitian Boat People, supra note 40, at 345 (stating that the balance
legislators are trying to maintain with present asylum legislation is delicate). A "mini-
malist" approach will allow entry to fewer refugees each year. Id. An "activist" ap-
proach could invite too many asylum-seekers and create an immigration emergency.
Id. The extent to which this administration achieves a balance will have a lasting
effect on future United States refugee protection. Id.
50. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 201 (stating that the right to apply for
provisional asylum attaches when an alien is physically present in the United States
or at a land border or port of entry). This provision seeks to amend § 208(a) of the
Immigration and Nationalization Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). Id. Most of the
bills pending before Congress preserve the right of aliens to apply for asylum if pres-
ent in the United States or at a land border or a port of entry. See, e.g., S. 1348.
supra note 48, at § 210; S. 1358, supra note 48, at § 210; S. 1351, supra note 48.
at § 301 (stating that an alien in the United States or at a land border or a port of
entry has the right to apply for asylum); see also infra notes 45-52 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the increased rights of asylum-seekers once present in the United
States).
51. See infra notes 62-92 and accompanying text (examining the current asylum
legislation before Congress). The two principal pieces of legislation are President
Clinton's Expedited Exclusion and Alien Smuggling Enhanced Penalties Act of 1993,
introduced as S. 1333 by Senator Edward M. Kennedy on July 30, 1993, and the
Immigration Enforcement and Asylum Reform Act of 1993, which Representative
Romano Mazzoli introduced as H.R. 2602 on July 1, 1993 and which is now pending
as H.R. 3363. Id. S. 1333 is narrowly tailored to domestic issues concerning asylum
and illegal alien smuggling. Id. H.R. 3363, in contrast, takes a wide scale approach to
immigration and asylum, proposing both domestic and international reform. See also
Interview with Robert Lange, staff member on the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
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Refugees may gain admission to the United States in two waysY
The United States may admit them from abroad,5 in which case the
admissions ceilings of the Refugee Act of 1980 apply,' or they may
apply for and receive asylum once they reach the United States." The
due process rights that attach to an asylum-seeker once he or she arrives
in the United States confer three distinct advantages over the rights of
refugees who fail to reach the United States.' First, once an asylum-
seeker reaches the United States, he or she is exempt from admissions
ceilings.' Second, asylum applicants may seek protection regardless of
immigration status. 8 Third, asylum-seekers may raise protection claims
as a defense to removal in immigration court proceedings or affirmative-
ly to the INS. 9 Asylum applicants may remain in the United States for
several years pending the outcome of their cases.' Many applicants
whose asylum claims the United States denies find other ways of ob-
taining legal residency or remain in the United States illegally.6
A. PRE-INSPECTIONS AT FOREIGN AIRPORTS
To minimize the likelihood that refugees will gain permanent resi-
dence in the United States, Congress has implemented political asylum
legislation and proposes to expand efforts to prevent refugees from
reaching United States territory.' For example, H.R. 3363, the Immi-
Immigration and Refugee Affairs, in Washington, D.C. (October 1993) (stating that
both the Kennedy and Mazzoli bills are expected to receive approval and that some
hybrid of these bills will most likely constitute the new United States asylum law).
52. See Haitian Boat People. supra note 40, at 333-34 (discussing the manners in
which refugees may gain admission to the United States).
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1988).
54. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988).
56. See Haitian Boat People, supra note 40. at 335 (discussing the rights that
attach during the asylum application process).
57. See id. (discussing the inapplicability of admission ceilings to asylum-seekers
who reach the United States).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
59. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (1992).
60. 119 CONG. REc. SI0,432 (daily ed. Aug. 4. 1993) (statement of Sen.
Johnston) (complaining that the average asylum claim takes two years to process).
61. Id. (stating that the United States does not detain most aliens, and therefore;
aliens drop out of sight while awaiting adjudication of their claims).
62. See 117 CONG. REc. S9.993 (daily ed. July 30. 1993) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (announcing that President Clinton intends to seek an additional S171.5
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gration Enforcement and Asylum Reform Act of 1993, proposes pre-
inspection of refugees at foreign airports.63 It also requires the INS to
train airline employees to detect fraudulent documents.' Such provi-
sions aim to limit the number of aliens who make political asylum
claims at United States airports without official, or with fraudulent,
documentation."5
B. EXPEDITING THE PROCESS
Current legislative proposals would also expedite asylum application
processing.' These provisions call for the immediate dismissal of asy-
lum claims by aliens who manage to arrive in the United States with
fraudulent documentation, or with no documentation at all.6' Although
aliens may credibly fear persecution even if they cannot document it,68
million in fiscal year 1994 to curb illegal immigration). The FY 1994 Justice Depart-
ment Appropriations Act includes these monies. Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-121 (1993). Although S. 1333 and S. 2836 do not specifically address pre-inspec-
tions at foreign airports, President Clinton intends to allocate resources to carry out
these inspections. Id. These two bills do, however, contain anti-smuggling and summa-
ry exclusion proposals. Id.
63. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 301 (stating that the Attorney General
shall establish and maintain pre-inspection stations in at least three foreign airports the
United States identifies as last points of departure for substantial numbers of passen-
gers traveling to the United States).
64. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 304 (stating that the Attorney General
shall provide for expenditures relating to the training of, and technical assistance to,
commercial airline personnel).
65. See 119 CONG. REC. S10,432, supra note 60 (declaring that this legislation is
important because it will prevent many aliens from reaching the United States).
66. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 302 (calling for the expeditious process-
ing of asylum claims at airports); S. 1333, supra note 48, at § 2 (proposing accel-
eration of asylum processing).
67. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 101 (stating that immigration officials
should immediately dismiss claims that refugees inadequately document); S. 1333,
supra note 48, at §§ 2(a), 2(b) (proposing the immediate dismissal of a claim where
the applicant either fails to present documentation or presents fraudulent documentation
to an immigration official); see also 119 CONG. REC. S10,433 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1993) (statement of Sen. Johnston) (stating that tightening documentation requirements
would prevent refugees with frivolous claims from manipulating the system).
68. See S. 1333, supra note 48, at § 2(b) (defining a credible fear of persecution
as a "substantial likelihood" that the alien's statements are true, and that the alien
could establish eligibility as a refugee within the meaning of § 102(a)(42)(A) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), or who the United States could return to a country
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an INS officer, subject only to immediate supervisory review,' may
deem this fear incredible and return the alien immediately." In this cir-
cumstance, the proposed legislation stipulates that a petition for habeas
corpus is the only form of judicial review.7'
The new proposals, furthermore, place an affirmative burden on an
applicant with valid documentation to articulate at least an intention to
file an asylum claim within thirty days of arrival.' Currently, the Unit-
ed States fails to detect many refugees for months or years. These refu-
gees only apply for asylum once the United States apprehends them.
The thirty-day deadline would prevent asylum-seekers from using fear of
persecution as a defense in a deportation hearing, unless they can show
that they are refugees sur place because changed circumstances in the
country of origin have created a fear of persecution that did not exist
when they departed' Proposed legislation also would ban those aliens
who fail to appear at hearings from receiving any benefits under the
Act.74 Finally, asylum applicants would have to submit to fingerprinting
and photographing, as well as pay any fees the Attorney General deems
where there is a substantial likelihood he or she could establish eligibility as a refu-
gee).
69. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 201 (giving sole decision-making authori-
ty to specially trained asylum officers in an effort to streamline the processing of
claims). At present, an INS asylum officer, a Justice Department immigration judge.
or in some circumstances both agents, consider claims. Id.
70. See id. at § 201 (stating that the INS official has the discretion to return the
alien immediately).
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), INA § 106(a); see infra notes 80-84 and accompanying
text (discussing present asylum legislation limitations on judicial review); see also
Stephen H. Legomsky, A Research Agenda for Immigration Law: A Report to the
Administrative Conference of the United States. 25 SAN DIEGO L REv. 227. 242-43
(1988) (discussing the ability of aliens the United States holds in custody pursuant to
deportation hearings to obtain judicial review by habeas corpus).
72. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48. at § 201 (requiring that asylum-seekers state
an intention to file for asylum within thirty days of arrival).
73. See OFFICE OF TE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, 1 94. U.N. Doc.
HCR/IPI4/Eng. Rev. 1 (1988) (defining "refugee sur place" as an individual 'who was
not a refugee when he [or she] left his [or her] country, but who becomes a refugee
at a later date").
74. See, e.g., H.R. 3363. supra note 48, at § 202: S. 1358, supra note 48. at §
202; S. 1348, supra note 48, at § 202; S. 1351. supra note 48, at § 303 (stating that
applicants who fail to appear for scheduled asylum hearings become ineligible for
benefits under the Act).
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reasonable." The above proposals indicate Congressional intent to re-
place "asylum" with "provisional asylum."76
C. RESERVING THE RIGHT TO SEND REFUGEES
TO WILLING COUNTRIES
Current asylum proposals would permit the United States to send
refugees, at any time, to other countries willing to accept them."' These
provisions apply with equal force to refugees the United States has
already granted provisional asylum, thus permitting the Attorney General
to terminate a refugee's provisional asylum status when another country
agrees to accept the alien.7" Recent diplomatic efforts to encourage
third countries to accept Haitian and Cuban refugees suggest that inter-
national interdependence will foster increased use of legal provisions for
refugee-sharing."
D. LIMITING JUDICIAL REVIEW
Under current legislative proposals, asylum-seekers the United States
deems excludable could obtain judicial review only through the narrow
avenue of habeas corpus.' These provisions would disallow substantive
75. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 201 (delineating fingerprinting and fee
requirements for asylum applicants); see also S. 1333, supra note 48, at § 5 (propos-
ing an additional increase of immigration user fees for commercial aircraft and vessel
passengers).
76. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 202 (striking "asylum" and inserting
"provisional asylum").
77. See id. at § 201 (stating that the right to provisional asylum does not apply
if the Attorney General identifies a country willing to accept the alien, provided it is
not the original country from which the alien seeks refuge, and the alien is unable to
establish a likelihood that such a country would threaten his or her life or freedom
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion); see also S. 1333, supra note 48, at § 2(b) (allowing the United
States to send aliens who could establish eligibility to another country where the
same opportunity and protection exist).
78. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 201 (permitting the Attorney General to
revoke a refugee's provisional asylum if another country is willing to receive the
refugee).
79. See Haitian Boat People, supra note 40. at 346 (suggesting that the United
States should undertake a diplomatic effort to establish relations with countries which
could provide temporary relief for refugees arriving in the United States).
80. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 202; S. 1333, supra note 48, at § 4(a);
S. 1358, supra note 48, at § 202; S. 1348, supra note 48, at § 203; S. 1351, supra
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review of decisions to exclude refugees."' Courts of Appeals could ex-
amine only whether the petitioner is an alien and whether the United
States correctly followed the statutory procedures in reaching its decision
to exclude.1 Regardless of the nature of the claim, no court would
have jurisdiction to consider the validity of any adjudication or determi-
nation of exclusion, to certify a class in an action, or to provide declara-
tory or injunctive relief. Nor could refugees collaterally attack exclu-
sion decisions during actions brought against them to assess penalties for
improper entry or re-entry.'
E. REVITALIZED BORDER PATROLS
Pending legislation calls for an increase in the number of border
patrol officers and the number of asylum officers.? The Asylum Re-
form and Alien Smuggling Control Act of 199 3' proposes an increase
of 1,000 border patrol officers for fiscal year 1994, and for the same
fiscal year,' an increase to not less than twice the average number of
note 48, at § 304 (limiting the scope of judicial review for those deemed excludable
from the United States solely to habeas corpus).
81. See H.R. 3363. supra note 48. at § 202: S. 1333. supra note 48. at § 4(a):
S. 1358, supra note 48. at § 202: S. 1348. supra note 48. at § 203: S. 1351. supra
note 48, at § 304 (stating that no court would have the power to review exclusion
decisions).
82. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48. at § 202: S. 1358, supra note 48. at § 304:
S. 1348, supra note 48, at § 203: S. 1351, supra note 48. at § 304 (stipulating the
limitations on habeas corpus review in asylum cases): see also S. 1333. supra note
48, at § 4 (promulgating the same limitations as the corresponding legislation and in
addition requiring the petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
or she is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence).
83. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 202; S. 1358. supra note 48. at § 202:
S. 1348, supra note 48. at § 203; S. 1351. supra note 48. at § 304 (delineating
additional limitations on the jurisdiction of courts when reviewing asylum decisions).
84. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48. at § 202; S. 1358, supra note 48. at § 202:
S. 1348, supra note 48, at § 203; S. 1351, supra note 48. at § 304 (restricting the
use of collateral attacks in these circumstances).
85. See S. 1348, supra note 48. at §§ 301-02 (calling for an increase in the
number of border patrol and asylum officers); see also 117 CONG. REc. S9.994 (daily
ed. July 30, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that President Clinton intends
to allocate $45.1 million to increase border patrol personnel and technology).
86. S. 1348. supra note 48.
87. See also S. 1351, supra note 48, at § 701 (suggesting an increase in the
number of full-time INS border patrol officers to 5.900 in fiscal year 1994. 6.900 in
fiscal year 1995, 7,900 in fiscal year 1996. 8,900 in fiscal year 1997, and 9.900 in
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asylum officers in fiscal year 1993.8 As the United States has long
employed a disproportionately small number of border patrol and asylum
officers relative to the number of refugees it is confronted with annual-
ly, Congress is expected to approve such increases.
F. INCREASED APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE INS
All pending immigration legislation acknowledges the need for in-
creased resources to confront the problem of increased immigration.
Some bills merely appropriate funds necessary to implement their provi-
sions; 9 other legislation proposes specific increases.' For instance, the
Immigration Enforcement and Asylum Reform Act of 1993 proposes an
INS allocation of $1.082 billion for fiscal year 1994, with $413 million
earmarked for expanded border patrol operations and $27.43 million for
anti-smuggling activities.9' For fiscal 1995, the Act allocates $1.154 bil-
lion, with $454 million allocated to border patrols and $31 million to
anti-smuggling activities.'
III. THE EROSION OF POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
German asylum law has changed gradually over the past thirty
years.93 A dramatic rise in the number of asylum claims in the late
fiscal year 1998).
88. See H.R. 3223, supra note 48, at § 5; S. 1351, supra note 48, at § 302
(calling for an increase in the number of asylum officers).
89. See S. 1348, supra note 48, at § 303 (authorizing an increase in appropri-
ations necessary to implement the provisions of the Act).
90. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 401; S. 1358, supra note 48, at § 401
(delineating specific resource allocations in connection with INS employee increase).
91. See H.R. 3363, supra note 48, at § 401 (proposing specific increases in INS
allocations over the next few years).
92. See id. at § 401 (calling for enough funds to provide for a 100 percent in-
crease in the average number of asylum officers over the fiscal 1993 period by Octo-
ber 1, 1996). The bill also appropriates:
(1) funds for the purchase of police-type use passenger motor vehicles; (2)
funds for the acquisition, lease, maintenance, and operation of aircraft; (3) funds
for the purchase of uniforms; (4) funds not to exceed $50,000 to meet unfore-
seen emergencies of a confidential character; and (5) funds not to exceed
$500,000 of those sums appropriated for research and $17,188,000 of those
funds appropriated for construction.
Id.
93. See, e.g., HANS KREUBERG, GRUNDRECHT AUF ASYL 21-25 (1984) (discussing
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1970s' prompted the German government (Bundestag) to centralize its
asylum process, beginning in 1980."' The Bundestag hoped that altering
its policy would deter applicants with frivolous claims from entering the
country, expedite adjudication, and limit both applicants' employment
authorization and their access to social welfare benefits.'
This centralization process culminated in the 1982 Asylum Procedures
Law.97 This statute allocated asylum-seekers among the German states
(Linder), following a percentage formula that tracked the population and
resources of each state (Land), in order to maximize the efficient and
equitable use of resources."8 Although the 1982 Asylum Procedures
Law generally met with cautious optimism, skeptics claimed-as do
critics of asylum laws in the United States-that politics frequently
the initial controversy over the language in German asylum provisions): HEa.1ur
QUARTITSCH, EINWANDERUNGLAND BUNDESREPUBUK DEUTSCHLAND? AKMruLE
REFORMFRAGEN DES AUSLANDERRECHTS 28-40 (1981) (discussing the political impor-
tance of asylum rights); Maryellen Fullerton, Persecution Due To Membership In A
Particular Social Group: Jurisprudence in the Federal Republic of Germany. 4 GEO.
INMIGR. L.J. 381, 389 n.30 (1990) [hereinafter Social Group] (stating that as a result
of Germany's signing of the 1951 Convention. it adheres to a definition of "refugee"
as a person persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a
particular social group).
94. See Political Asylum, supra note 8. at 197 (stating that asylum-seekers filed
9,627 claims in 1975 compared with 107.818 in 1980).
95. See Daniel Kanstroom, Wer Sind Wir Wieder? Laws of Asylum. Immigration.
and Citizenship in the Struggle for the Soul of the New Germany. 18 YALE 1. INT'L
L. 155, 195 (1993) [hereinafter Laws of Asylum] (discussing the evolution of German
asylum law).
96. See id. at 195 (delineating the goals of the Bundestag in altering its asylum
policy).
97. Gesetz fiber das Asylverfahren, July 16. 1982. BGB1.1 946 [hereinafter 1982
Asylum Law]; see also Political Asylum. supra note 8, at 197-203 (discussing the
specific procedures of German asylum law). See generally Gerald L Neuman, Inmi-
gration and Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & PoL. 35 (delineating the procedures of German asylum law); Maryellen
Fullerton, Restricting the Flow of Asylum Seekers in Belgium. Denmark the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands. 29 VA. J. INT'L L 33. 69 (1988) (ex-
amining asylum procedures in Germany).
98. 1982 Asylum Law. supra note 97. at § 22. The law does not allow asylum-
seekers to choose their place of residence. Id. Although allocation of refugees has not
cured the crisis in Germany, it remains a viable method for sharing the political and
economic costs of the asylum problem. Id. The global system of collective responsi-
bility that the author recommends derives its foundation from this part of the 1982
Asylum Procedures Law. See infra notes 197-203 and accompanying text (proposing a
formula for collective responsibility).
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influenced the decisions of officials responsible for initial processing of
asylum claims."
Although the Bundestag designed the 1982 Asylum Procedures Law
to expedite the asylum process, its implementation failed to stem the
tide of asylum-seekers."° This failure prompted the Bundestag to mod-
ify its laws, once again, in 1987."'1 The 1987 Asylum Law authorized
border police to deny entry to an asylum-seeker they deemed to have
received protection in another country 2 and extended the ban on em-
ployment from two to five years. 3 Nevertheless, this new asylum law
could not withstand the subsequent influx of refugees that, in large part,
the end of the Cold War generated.
IV. THE END OF POLITICAL ASYLUM IN GERMANY
A. THE RATIONALE FOR REFORM
Citing the high cost of maintaining its asylum system,"~' the over-
99. See Laws of Asylum, supra note 95, at 195 (noting that asylum applications
filter through local authorities to the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign
Refugees [Bundesamt fiir die Anerkennung ausliindischer Flilchtlinge] (BAF). The Ger-
man Constitution guarantees the right to have an administrative court review a denial
of an asylum application in the state in which the asylum-seeker resides. Id. See also
Social Group, supra note 93, at 392-94 (examining judicial review for asylum-seekers
in Germany). Although judicial review would appear to provide some protection
against the political bias of immigration officials, some observers believe that politics
also influence the courts. See, e.g., Political Asylum, supra note 8, at 205 (stating
that disparities in the number of asylum applicants recognized from Eastern Europe,
Western Europe, and Asia reflects politicizing of the asylum process). The judges in
these courts, however, tout their decisions as apolitical, in large part because they
maintain a degree of independence from administrative authorities. See id. at 207
(stating that the process of determining the facts of a case makes asylum procedures
susceptible to politicizing because investigating the conditions in an applicant's country
of origin may require judges to consider the German Foreign Ministry's comments,
newspaper articles, and other politically-motivated reports). The judges claim that
politics do not influence their decisions; pointing out, for example, that they some-
times refuse to reach decisions in order to prolong the applicant's stay in Germany
and increase his or her chances of receiving a residence card. Id. at 208.
100. See Laws of Asylum, supra note 95, at 196 n.331 (noting that the BAF took
nine to eleven months on average to decide on applications and that the appeals
process took another two to three years).
101. Gesetz zur Anderung asylverfahrensrechtlicher, arbeitserlaubnisrechtlicher und
auslinderrechtlicher Vorschriften, Jan. 6, 1987, BGBI.189.
102. Id. at § 1(2).
103. Id. at § 2(1).
104. See Yuri Shnpakov, Germany: War Against Refugees, Moscow Nnws, Juno
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whelming number of frivolous claims,"5 and increasing public disfavor
with asylum policy,"° the Bundestag in 1993 approved an amendment
to article 16 of the Constitution'" along with an implementing
statute.
08
1. The Escalating Numbers
The 6.2 million foreigners living in Germany today"° include 1.5
million refugees, more than 600,000 asylum-seekers whose claims Ger-
many has not ruled on definitively"0 and another 100,000 individuals
2, 1993 (stating that Germany spends six billion DM [$3.57 billion] on persons who
have applied for political asylum).
105. See German Bundestag Votes To Restrict The Right To Asylum; Bonn In A
State Of Siege, WEEK IN GERMANY. May 28. 1993, at 1 (statements of Wolfgang
Schaeuble, Chairperson, CDU/CSU parliamentary group, Herman Otto Solms, Chairper-
son, FDU, and Hans Ulrich Klose, Chairperson, SPD) (stating that the amendment
aimed to stop a massive abuse of asylum rights).
106. Id. (stating that the preservation of internal peace necessitated altering the
right to political asylum).
107. Geserz zur Anderung des Grundgeseizes yone 28 Jumi 1993 [Law of June 28.
1993 to Amend Article 16 of the Basic Law], 1993 BGBI.l 1002. The German Con-
stitution is officially known as the Basic Law [Grundgesetz]. Originally conceived as
a transitional document pending reunification, it has acquired the status of a genuine
constitution. See Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40
EMORY L.J. 837 (1990) (describing the legal status of the Basic Law).
108. Gesetz zur Anderung asylverfahrensrechtlicher-auslander-und
staatsangehorigkeitscrechtlicher Vorschriften. 1993 BGBI.1 1062 [hereinafter Asylum
Procedure Act of 1993].
109. Margaret Talbot. Germany bars the door. no asylum for auslanders. 258 NA-
TION 832 (1994). Under German law, blood relation defines citizenship. "Foreigners."
therefore, includes those individuals born and raised in Germany and those who speak
German. See Laws of Asylum, supra note 95. at 172 (detailing the relationship be-
tween asylum laws and citizenship laws in Germany). This exclusionary concept of
citizenship contrasts sharply with the genuine commitment to fundamental human
rights and equality contained in the German Constitution. which states that "[plersons
persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right of asylum." GRtUNDGESMEZ [Con-
stitution] [GG] art. 16a (1993). See generally Daniel Kanstroom, The Shining City and
the Fortress: Reflections on the "Eurosolution" to the German Immigration Dilemma.
16 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 201, at nn.169-242 and accompanying text [herein-
after Shining City] (discussing the interaction of immigration, nationalism, and citizen-
ship in the European Community).
110. See Political Asylum. supra note 8. at 207 (discussing the role of German
courts in asylum adjudication). Asylum-seekers file applications with local authorities
who forward the applications to the BAF. Id. A court of the state in which the appli-
cant lives reviews denials of asylum claims. Id.
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Germany has granted refugee status."' In addition, 640,000 de facto
refugees live in Germany." 2 Germany absorbs seventy percent of the
total number of refugees absorbed into the European Community
(EC)."3 This disproportionate burden is a major impetus for the adop-
tion of new asylum laws." 4
These data reflect the dramatic rise in the number of asylum-seekers
over the past few years. In 1992, Germany received more than 438,000
The German asylum process differs from that of the United States in two im-
portant respects. First, German administrative judges belong to the judicial branch and
are more comparable to United States federal judges than to the immigration judges
of the Department of Justice, whose decisions are subject to review by the BIA and
the Attorney General. Id. German administrative review is formally independent of the
political branches, whereas reviewing authorities in the United States are more suscep-
tible to political pressures. Id.
Second, Germany does not place the formal burden of proof on the asylum
applicant. Id. The court must make an "independent. de novo, investigation of the
case" in reaching its conclusions. Id. In contrast, the United States requires the asy-
lum applicant to demonstrate the veracity of his or her claim, and courts cannot in-
quire independently into the facts of a case. Id. See also Neuman, supra note 97, at
36 (comparing the process of immigration and judicial review in the United States
and in Germany).
111. See Steve Crenshaw, hnmigration: Germany: Hand of Welcome Keeps Visitors
at Arm's Length, INDEPENDENT, June 6, 1993, at 17 (stating that 130,000 family
members accompanied these recognized refugees). The decision to tighten the asylum
law is particularly ironic in light of the huge armies of guest workers (Gastarbeiter)
whom Germany encouraged to immigrate after World War II to help reconstruct its
economy, but who were never eligible for German citizenship. Id. Now these same
people are bearing the brunt of the new asylum law. Id. See also John Fox, Calls
For Easier Citizenship Grow: Killing of Turks Brings Outcry Against Violence To
Foreigners, FIN. POST, June 19, 1993, § 5, at S14 (describing right wing violence
against guest workers); Note, German Asylum Law Reform and the European Com.
nunmity: Crisis in Europe, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 795 (1993) (describing proposals to
facilitate naturalization of Turkish guest workers).
112. See German Information Center, Laws on Asylum Procedure Urgency and
Focuses of Reform, at 1 (July 1993) (on file with the German Embassy, Washington,
D.C.) [hereinafter German Information Center] (defining de facto refugees as rejected
asylum-seekers whom Germany has not deported for humanitarian or political reasons).
Under the new asylum law, the government has begun deporting large numbers of de
facto refugees. See also Talbot, supra note 109 (describing the German government's
proposal to deport 100,000 Croatian refugees).
113. See id. (stating that Germany accounts for more than seventy percent of the
refugees the EC nations absorb).
114. See id. (stating that Germany's disproportionately greater absorption rate has
created financial and social hardships that make continued application of the German
asylum law untenable).
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applications for asylum,"5 up from 256,000 in 1991 and approximately
193,000 in 1990.116 In the first four months of 1993, approximately
161,000 asylum-seekers arrived in Germany, the largest number of
whom were Romanians."' This influx marked an increase from the
same period in 1992, which saw 124,000 asylum-seekers."'
2. Frivolous Claims
The Bundestag maintains that refugees abuse its asylum system."9
For example, in the second week in April 1993, multiple or false ap-
plications comprised 25.7% of the applications refugees submitted for
social welfare assistance payments.'" Germany recognized only 1.7%
of those who sought asylum in April 1993 as having a well-founded
fear of political persecution.' 2' The German government claims that
this high percentage of denials establishes that many asylum claims are
frivolous and merits legislative reform.'"
115. See Bundestag (Again) Debates Proposed New Laws on Foreigners and Asy-
lum Seekers; Majority Support Likely, WEEK IN GERMANY, Mar. 5. 1993. at I (re-
porting the number of asylum applications in 1992).
116. See id. (describing the increase in asylum applications from 1991 to 1992).
117. See Germany's Agreement With Romania, VANCOUVER SUN, June 5. 1993. at
I (stating that the influx of Romanian refugees prompted Germany to enter into an
agreement with Romania under which Germany would accelerate the deportation of
Romanian asylum-seekers); see also Jonathan Kaufman. Germany Hastens Erit of
Gypsies, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1, 1992. at 1. 32 (discussing deportation of Romanians
from Germany).
118. See VANCOUVER SUN, supra note 117, at I (stating that Germany experienced
an increase in asylum-seekers from the first four months of 1992 to the first four
months of 1993).
119. See German Information Center. supra note 112. at 1 (stating that asylum
abuse motivates the revision of German asylum laws).
120. See id. (documenting abuse of the social welfare assistance program in Ger-
many).
121. See id. (noting that only 1.7% of the April 1993 asylum claims succeeded).
But see Talbot, supra note 109 (pointing out that under its new asylum policy. Ger-
many is deporting refugees who in the past would have qualified for asylum, such as
conscientious objectors and victims of civil conflicts). German courts have held that
because only states can effect political persecution, refugees from areas outside the
effective control of any state, such as Somalia and Bosnia. cannot qualify for asylum
regardless of their fear of persecution. Id. See also Political Asylum, supra note 8. at
233-40 (stating that deficiencies in processing of asylum claims contributes to the low
number of candidates who receive asylum).
122. See German Information Center, supra note 112, at I (discussing the rationale
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3. Increased Crime
The Bundestag asserts that a disproportionately greater number of
asylum candidates participate in crime relative to the total German popu-
lation. 23 The percentage share of crime it attributes to asylum appli-
cants increased from 1.3% in 1984 to 10.9% in 1992." The percent-
age shares are particularly large, the Bundestag maintains, for robbery,
trafficking and smuggling of heroin, shoplifting, and aggravated larce-
ny."z In addition, Germany attributes 38.5% of its 1992 rape cases to
non-Germans, 11.4% of whom were asylum-seekers.' Such data
aroused German citizens' discontent with their government's lenient
asylum policies.
4. Financial Costs
The Bundestag states that the government spends over seven billion
deutsche marks (DM) ($4.54 billion) 7 per year on social welfare as-
sistance for the more than 600,000 asylum-seekers with pending cas-
es. 2 ' It spends DM 1 billion ($648 million) a year on such medical
benefits as prenatal and maternity care.2 9 The annual cost per asylum
candidate in 1991 was DM 7,000 ($4,540). 13' The government at-
for German asylum reform).
123. See id. (discussing asylum-seekers' disproportionately high participation in
crime).
124. See id. (delineating the increase in the percentage of crimes Germany attribut-
es to asylum applicants from 1984 to 1992).
125. See Comments by Secretary Eduard Lintner, Bundestag Publication 12/4735,
question 28 (indicating the areas of crime in which most asylum-seekers participate, in
response to a parliamentary query).
126. See Bundestag Record, April 28, 1993, Annex 3 (documenting non-German
and asylum-seeker participation in German rapes).
127. The author calculates all subsequent deutsche mark conversions into United
States dollars using a United States dollar factor of $.6486, the conversion factor at
the close of the United States currency markets on September 14, 1994.
128. See German Information Center, supra note 112, at 2 (documenting the costs
Germany incurs to maintain its asylum system). This figure assumes an average ex-
penditure of approximately DM 1,000 ($648) per recipient per month, including hous-
ing and incidental costs. Id.
129. See id. (documenting the cost of providing maternity and prenatal care for
asylum-seekers).
130. See id. (citing the results of a German Bundestag Research Service survey
documenting the costs Germany incurs per asylum-seeker).
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tributes these costs to administrative infrastructure and rent subsidies for
candidates.' 3' In 1992 alone, the Bundestag's total cost in connection
with asylum-seekers exceeded the DM 8.27 billion ($5.36 billion) the
Foreign Ministry allocated for economic cooperation and develop-
ment.
32
V. THE POLITICAL BATTLE
Although the foregoing statistics might appear to compel government
action, proposals for reform of asylum law triggered an intense political
debate within the Bundestag.'"3 In the end, the resurgence in right
wing radicalism,'" coupled with a series of xenophobic attacks from
131. See id. (attributing outlays per asylum-seeker to expenditures for infrastructure
and rent subsidies).
132. See id. (comparing total asylum expenditures to economic development
spending).
133. See, e.g., Rolf Soderlind, German Asylum Deal Criticized, Reuters Library
Report, Dec. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (noting that
German newspapers and politicians accused the Bundestag of disingenuously attempt-
ing to turn neighboring countries into buffer states that would impede the flow of
refugees to Germany); Kohl, Opposition Fail to Agree on Asylum: Racist Attacks
Continue, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Nov. 29, 1992. available in LEXIS. Nexis Li-
brary, OMNI File (stating that the Christian Social Union. the Christian Democratic
Union of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the opposition Social Democrats could not
reach an agreement on a proposal to amend an article of the Constitution guarantee-
ing political asylum); The SDP Special Convention, WEEK IN GERiANY. Nov. 20.
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (discussing the Social Democrat-
ic Party's inability to reach a consensus on the proposal to eliminate the right to
asylum in Germany).
134. See GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, Focus ON . .. RIGHTWINO RADICALISM
IN GERMANY, Mar. 1993, at 1 (documenting the resurgence of right wing radicalism
in Germany). Many attribute the upsurge in right wing radicalism to financial prob-
lems associated with the reconstruction of Eastern Germany and the dramatic increase
in the number of asylum-seekers entering Germany. Id. The Office for the Protection
of the Constitution [Verfassungsschutz], Germany's domestic security agency, reported
a total of 2,285 right wing extremist acts of violence in 1992. most of which were
against foreigners, an increase of 54% over 1991. Id. Seventeen of these extremist
acts were murders. I& at 2. Violence occurs throughout the Lilnder. Id. North Rhine-
Westphalia suffered the highest number of attacks in 1992. 513 and 256. respectively.
Id. Hamburg and Breman experienced the fewest number of attacks, thirty-six and two
respectively. Id. Mecklenburg-Vorpommem and Brandenburg were the states with the
highest incidence per 100,000 residents, with 9.52 and 8.52 per 100.000 residents
respectively. l
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1991 to 1993, 31 provided the impetus for changing the asylum
laws.'36 These attacks set in motion a political debate between Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the oppo-
sition Social Democratic Party (SDP).'37 Chancellor Kohl argued that
Germany should amend its constitutional right to asylum both to protect
foreigners who might enter the country, and to appease an increasingly
intolerant public. 38  The SDP maintained that a constitutional
amendment would undermine Germany's post-World War II commitment
to human rights, arguing instead for a statutory solution to the refugee
crisis.' 39
On May 26, 1993, after a thirteen-hour debate and months of political
turmoil, the Bundestag approved a constitutional amendment. 4 The
The right wing movement is gaining strength. Id. at 3. Approximately 65,000
persons in Germany possess extreme right wing convictions, 41,000 of whom affiliate
with major parties of the extreme right. Id. The German People's Union (Deutsche
Volksunion or DVU) is the largest of these parties, with approximately 25,000 mem-
bers. Id. The National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partie
Deutschlands or NPD) is the oldest party, with approximately 5,000 members. Id.
135. See id. (discussing acts of right wing violence during the 1991-1993 period).
The German government makes a distinction between right wing attacks and xenopho-
bic attacks, noting that although members of right wing groups commit many crimes
against foreigners, they target other minority groups as well. Id. Nor can one assume
that every xenophobic attack relates to right wing activity. Id.
136. See AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, supra note 133, at I (stating that racist attacks
on foreigners provided a catalyst for the Bundestag to act expeditiously in revising its
asylum law). For example, right wing radicals set a foreigners' hotel ablaze and
stabbed a nineteen year-old Turkish immigrant in a wave of neo-Nazi, racist and anti-
Semitic bloodshed over the government's failure to reach an agreement on the consti-
tutional amendment to restrict Germany's asylum laws. Id. Israel issued a stem appeal
for Germany to put an end to the violence. Id.
137. See Governing Coalition Passes Resolution Calling for Change of Asylm
Law: SDP Boycotts the Vote, WEEK IN GERMANY, Oct. 16, 1992, at 1 (highlighting
the tension between the coalition party and the SDP over the change in the asylum
law).
138. See id. (stating that Chancellor Helmut Kohl proposed a constitutional amend-
ment affecting the right to asylum). Although the coalition parties had a genuine con-
cern for foreigners' safety, this concern was secondary to the impact of amending the
asylum law on Chancellor Kohl's re-election prospects. Id. See Prospects for Profits:
Germany through 1995, BUSINEss INT'L, Apr. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, OMNI File (predicting that social and economic tensions resulting from the
German refugee situation would prompt Chancellor Kohl to either resign before or
lose the next election).
139. See Laws of Asylum, supra note 95, at 199 (stating that the SDP insisted on
a statutory approach to asylum reform).
140. See German Bundestag Votes to Restrict the Right to Asylum; Bonn In a
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vote was 521 in favor to 132 against, 4' indicating a mandate to
change the law. Deputies from the opposition SDP joined forces with
deputies from the CDU coalition parties, the Christian Social Union
(CSU), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) to assure passage of the
bill.4 Because the bill's passage required a two-thirds majority of the
662 deputies, and the coalition parties command a total of only 398
seats (319 for the CDU/CSU and 79 for the FDP), the votes of the
Social Democratic deputies were decisive.'43 Political analysts have
suggested that the SDP supported the bill in large part out of a desire to
neutralize the far-right Republican Party. "  Nonetheless, the vote
marked a victory for the Coalition parties and a setback for asylum-
seekers.
VI. CRITICAL PROVISIONS OF NEW LAW 16(a)
AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS
A. EXCLUSION OF APPLICANTS WHO ENTER
FROM A "SAFE THIRD COUNTRY"
The Asylum Procedure Act of 1993'- requires the deportation of
asylum candidates who enter Germany from a safe third country.'
For example, Germany will now return a candidate who travels
through47 Poland to get to Germany.'48 The premise of this law is
State of Siege, WEEK IN GERMANY, May 28. 1993. at 1 (reporting the Bundestag's
vote to amend the right to asylum).
141. See id. (stating the number of votes for and against the amendment).
142. See id. (describing the agreement the Btndestag parties reached for the asy-
lum amendment to pass). The 132 deputies who voted against the amendment includ-
ed the seventeen members of the Party of Democratic Socialism (the former East
German Workers' [Communist] Party, the Eastern German Alliance '90. who have
eight seats, and some Social Democratic and Liberal deputies). Id.
143. See id. (explaining the importance of the SDP vote on the asylum amend-
ment).
144. Id. (analyzing the SDP's strategy in supporting the amendment).
145. See Asylum Procedure Act of 1993. supra note 108. at art. I (setting out the
new procedures for asylum law in Germany).
146. Id. at art. 1(2)(1). See German Information Center, supra note 112, at 4
(stating that Germany may deport, without legal recourse, a refugee who passes
through a safe third country). Germany considers as "safe third countries" fellow
members of the EC or countries that subscribe to the UN Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees. Id.
147. See Blay & Zimmerman, supra note 10. at 369 (noting that in contrast to
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that since the candidate has already found protection in the "safe third
country," he or she can no longer fear persecution, and thus should not
have the additional right of choosing in which safe country to re-
side.'49 Although some argue that such a provision unfairly assumes
that all "safe" countries provide equal safety to refugees, 5 ' the intent
of this provision is to distinguish the non-economic factors that drive
refugees to seek haven in a safe country from the economic factors that
draw asylum-seekers residing in countries that are safe, but poor, to a
wealthy nation such as Germany.' By elevating all EC and all neigh-
the 1982 Asylum Law, which held that Germany could not return a refugee to a
third country unless he or she had remained in that country for three months (and
presumably had the opportunity to apply for asylum there), under the 1993 amend-
ment "mere travel through a secure third state . . . constitute[s] 'entry from' that
state."). But see id. at 376-77 (reporting that the German constitutional court stayed
the deportation of an Iraqi applicant who arrived in Germany via Turkey and Greece,
where under Greek law the applicant was not permitted to apply for asylum).
148. See Soderlind, supra note 133 (reporting a proposal by Interior Minister
Rudolf Seiters that refugees who arrive in Germany via Poland should have no claim
to asylum); Steve Crenshaw, Protests Erupt Over Vote to Limit Refugees; German
MPs Forced to Run Gauntlet of Demonstrators to Enter Parliament for Debate on
Constitutional Amendment, INDEPENDENT, May 27, 1993, at 12 (noting that Germany
has entered into an agreement with Poland to return asylum-seekers who enter Germa-
ny from Polish territory, and is negotiating a similar agreement with the Czech Re-
public); see also Germany's Agreement With Poland, WEEK IN GERMANY, May 14,
1993, at 1 (discussing the agreement between Germany and Poland).
149. See Blay & Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 366 (contending that the 1951
Convention's objective is to secure freedom from persecution, not to give asylum-
seekers a choice of states of refuge).
150. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Safe Country? Says Who?, 4 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
248, 248-49 (1992) (stating that in deciding which countries are "safe," officials may
fail to take account of the instability of judicial and political protection in an appar-
ently "safe country"). Administrators prefer the "safe country" approach because it is
likely to reduce the number of applicants quickly, allowing diversion of resources to
the more difficult cases. Id. at 248. Human rights and refugee advocates, however,
maintain that the "safe country" approach replaces the particularized inquiry that re-
spect for individual human rights demands with an unwarranted presumption that
presence in a "safe country" protects refugees' rights. Id. See also Blay &
Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 371 (questioning whether Poland and the Czech Re-
public have the capacity effectively to serve as states of first refuge).
151. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 150, at 249-50 (stating that the socioeconomic
complexity of many "countries of origin" makes it virtually impossible to separate
economic interests from political interests). Yet countries facing asylum crises view
separation of political and economic interests as critical to the protection of persons
with legitimate claims to asylum. Id. See generally Elizabeth Kay Harris, Economic
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boring nations to the status of "safe third country," the new asylum law
affects claims of the ninety percent of asylum-seekers who arrive in
Germany by land.'
B. EXPEDITED PROCEDURES
Another component of the Asylum Procedure Act of 1993 expedites
the process of obtaining asylum.'53 It allows immigration officials sum-
marily to reject the application of a refugee who has passed through a
"safe country," unless the refugee provides sufficient proof of political
persecution in that safe country." To remain in Germany, a refugee
who has passed through a "safe country" must overcome the presump-
tion that he or she no longer fears persecution by demonstrating that the
country from which he or she arrived presents a danger of political
persecution.'55 The government expects every applicant to reveal the
third country from which he or she enters Germany. "'
Additionally, this component places an increased burden on asylum-
seekers who have not passed through a "safe third country."' Even
Refugees: Unprotected in the United States by Virtue of an Inaccurate Label. 9 AM.
U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 269 (1993) (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing "eco-
nomic" from "political" refugees).
152. See The New Asylum Agreement. WEEK IN GERMANY. Dec. 11. 1992. at I
(stating that the new asylum law in Germany will affect asylum-seekers who arrive
by land). This change in the asylum law means that applicants who arrive by land
have practically no chance of securing a hearing. Id.
153. Asylum Procedure Act of 1993, supra note 108, at art. 1: see also Gesetz
zur Neuregelung der Leistungen an Asylbewverber yore 30 Juni 1993 [Law of June 30.
1993 to Amend Social Benefits Procedure for Asylum]. 1993 BGBI.l 1074. §§ 1. 10
[hereinafter Social Benefits Procedure of 19931 (implementing procedures to expedite
the processing of asylum applications). The Social Benefits Procedure of 1993 is a
derivative Act of the Asylum Procedure Act of 1993. and many provisions of these
two Acts are related. Id.
154. See Asylum Procedure Act of 1993. supra note 108. at art. 1 (stating that
Germany will summarily dismiss claims of asylum-seekers who lack proper documen-
tation).
155. See id. at art. 1 (requiring an applicant to establish the existence of political
persecution in the country from which he or she arrived); see also German Informa-
tion Center, supra note 112, at 4 (stating that asylum-seekers carry the burden of
establishing the danger of political persecution).
156. See Asylum Procedure Act of 1993. supra note 108. at art. 1; Social Benefits
Procedure of 1993, supra note 153, at § 1 (stating that Germany expects applicants to
cooperate in the administration of social benefits).
157. See id. (calling for the BAF to encourage the full cooperation of asylum ap-
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where an applicant arrives from a country Germany deems unsafe, the
government may reject the refugee's claim.'58 For instance, if the can-
didate cannot provide acceptable information to the judge or agent hear-
ing the case, the government's interest in expediting claims could result
in rejection of a legitimate application.'59
C. STEMMING ABUSE
The Asylum Procedure Act of 1993 also aims to prevent candidates
from submitting multiple applications for social welfare assistance pay-
ments."W In years past, Germany granted more than the stipulated
share of welfare payments to individuals who successfully abused the
system.'' The government intends to decrease the number of falsified
applications by implementing a new Automated Fingerprint Identification
System (AFIS). 62 Such procedural safeguarding meets with near-uni-
versal approval among German citizens. 63
plicants in the asylum process).
158. See id. (determining that Germany may reject legitimate claims under certain
circumstances).
159. See id. (permitting the rejection of legitimate claims).
160. See, e.g., Social Benefits Procedure of 1993, supra note 153, at § 3 (imple-
menting measures to prevent social welfare assistance abuse). The German Department
of the Interior [Bundesmninisteriun des innern] now provides food and clothing directly
to refugees instead of giving them stipends to purchase such items. Id. Refugees must
go in person to receive their welfare payments; they may not send a proxy. Id. Refu-
gees must exhaust completely any assets they possessed upon entering Germany before
they qualify for welfare assistance. Id. at § 7. Refugees may not receive welfare
benefits from both the federal government and a state government. Id. at § 9.
161. See German Information Center, supra note 112, at 5 (stating that asylum-
seekers often illegally receive multiple welfare assistance payments because there are
insufficient safeguards to prevent such occurrences). The "double identity" rate for the
first and second weeks of April 1993 was 19.4% and 25.7% respectively. Id.
162. See Social Benefits Procedure of 1993, supra note 153, at § 1 (effecting
measures to reduce falsification of welfare assistance applications); see also German
Information Center, supra note 112, at 5 (stating that the government seeks to imple-
ment a fingerprinting mechanism to curtail social welfare abuse).
163. See German Information Center, supra note 112, at 3 (stating that most pro-
cedural modifications Germany aims at reducing abuse meet with approval among
Germans).
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D. EC COMPATIBILITY
The Asylum Procedure Act of 1993 modifies German law to the
extent necessary for Germany to participate, without reservation, in
European agreements on jurisdiction for asylum proceedings. t An in-
dividual whom Germany acknowledges as having a legitimate claim to
asylum and having satisfied the new criteria does not have an absolute
right to asylum in Germany." Instead, Germany reserves the right to
distribute asylum-seekers to other EC nations, as well as to those na-
tions wishing to associate with the EC."
Germany not only reserves this right; it has also begun to establish
reciprocal agreements with neighboring European countries. On May 7,
1993, Germany and Poland entered into a cooperative agreement requir-
ing the Polish government to accept 10,000 refugees from Germany in
1993.67 This agreement aims to prevent Germany's new asylum law
from creating a disproportionate impact on the Poles by limiting the
number of refugees Poland must accept and assisting the Polish govern-
ment to accommodate the returnees."* But because the agreement does
not include refugees turned back at the German border, the new asylum
law will greatly increase the number of refugees Poland must ab-
sorb. 69
164. See Asylum Procedure Act of 1993, supra note 108. at art. I (permitting
German participation in cooperative jurisdictional agreements); see also German Infor-
mation Center, supra note 112, at 5 (stating that the new Asylum Procedure Act
allows Germany to participate in European agreements on jurisdiction for asylum
proceedings).
165. See Asylum Procedure Act of 1993. supra note 108. at art. I (allowing Ger-
many to transfer asylum-seekers to other countries).
166. See itL (endorsing sharing of the asylum burden among EC nations).
167. See WEEK IN GERMANY, supra note 148. at 1 (stating that under the
agreement Germany may return up to 10,000 asylum-seekers who have entered Ger-
many through Poland, if Germany rejects them within six months); see also Judy
Dempsey, Poland Agrees to Take Back Refugees, FiN. TIMEs. Feb. 10. 1993. at 2
(discussing the refugee agreement between Germany and Poland). Germany's threat to
impose visa requirements on Polish citizens was a probable factor in obtaining
Poland's signature on the agreement.
168. See WEEK N GERMANY, supra note 148, at I (noting that under the agree-
ment Germany was to give Poland DM 120 million [about S74 million) in aid during
the next year to expand its infrastructure and to accommodate asylum-seekers).
169. See Talbot, supra note 109 (noting that Poland has in turn signed readmis-
sion agreements with Bulgaria. Romania, Slovakia. and Ukraine, which may allow
Poland to return refugees it accepts from Germany to their countries of origin). Under
109
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The Schengen Agreement and Convention, 7' which standardize bor-
der patrols within Europe' to regulate drugs, arms, third party nation-
als, and refugees,' and the Dublin Convention' regulating asylum
procedures, exemplify Germany's interest in establishing reciprocal
agreements. The asylum provisions of the Schengen Agreement are
controversial because they prohibit asylum-seekers from applying for
asylum in any country but the state of first application.' Modification
of Basic Law 16 marks a concerted German effort to ensure its full
participation in the Schengen Agreement.'75
E. THE IMPACT OF BASIC LAW 16(A)
Although predicting the impact of the new asylum law is difficult,
76
the number of asylum-seekers registering in Germany has declined since
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, Germany has an ongoing responsibility for the
treatment of these refugees. See Blay & Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 372 ("If Ger-
many returns asylum seekers to a state on the basis of a determination that applica-
tion of the Refugee Convention is guaranteed in that state, Germany indirectly be-
comes responsible for the asylum seekers' treatment in that state in a manner consis-
tent with the Convention.").
170. Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common
Borders, June 14, 1985, and Convention Applying Their Agreement. June 19, 1990,
30 I.L.M. 68 [hereinafter Schengen Agreement].
171. Id. at arts. 2, 3, 6.
172. Id. at arts. 4, 5, 28-91.
173. The European Community Convention Determining the State Responsible for
Examining Applications for Asylum in One of the Member States of the European
Communities, June 15, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 425 (Dublin Convention). Observers generally
regard the Dublin Convention as a complement to the Schengen system. Shining City,
supra note 109, at n.132.
174. See Laws of Asylum, supra note 95, at 198 (stating that the asylum provi-
sions in the Schengen Agreement, which call for states to evaluate applications in
accordance with the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and the New York
Protocol, will create "a more restrictive asylum model for relatively liberal asylum
states").
175. See Schengen Agreement, supra note 170, pmbl. (stipulating that Germany,
the Benelux states, France, Portugal, Italy, and Spain have signed the Agreement).
176. German Information Center, Decline in Number of Asylum-seekers: Precise
Evaluation of Impact of New Asylum Law Not Yet Possible, at 1 (Sept. 9, 1993) (on
file with the German Embassy, Washington, D.C.) (noting that the Federal Ministry of
the Interior considered an evaluation of the new asylum law based solely on the
statistics of the last few months unreliable). How organizations that smuggle people
illegally across borders will respond to the new asylum law remains an important,
undetermined factor. Id.
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the law's enactment, according to the Interior Ministry.'" In July
1993, 20,658 asylum-seekers registered in Germany, a 33.7% drop from
the 31,123 who registered in June 1993."' In August 1993, Germany
registered only 14,521 asylum claims, a decrease of approximately 30%
from the previous month." Between January and August 1993.
259,193 asylum-seekers registered, a 5.4% decrease from 274,000 in the
same period in 199 2."sc In May 1993, the number of asylum applica-
tions the Federal Agency for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees adju-
dicated exceeded the number of incoming applications for the first
time.' For Basic Law 16(a) to meet its stated objective of reducing
the number of entitled asylum-seekers, the federal and state governments
must continue to join forces in implementing the new regulations.' "
VII. RECOMMENDATION FOR "COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY"
The global refugee crisis creates an agonizing paradox for the United
States and Germany, industrialized nations that historically have ab-
sorbed a disproportionate number of refugees for reasons of both hu-
manitarian principle and economic self-interest. ' On the one hand,
177. See id. (documenting the decline in registered asylum-seekers).
178. See id. (noting a decline in asylum-seekers in July 1993). The number of
asylum-seekers in March and April of 1993 exceeded 43,000. Id.
179. See id (noting a decrease in the number of asylum applications for August
1993).
180. See id. (noting a decrease in asylum applicants over the first eight months of
1993).
181. See id. (noting the number of asylum cases upon which Germany ruled ex-
ceeded the number of incoming applications for the first time). The number of rulings
increased 23.5 percent in June 1993 to 53.620. Id. Germany ruled on approximately
50.000 applications in July and 48.519 in August. Id.
182. See id. (citing the need for state and federal cooperation with the new asy-
lum law). From January 1993 to August 1993 68.733 asylum applicants came from
Romania, 51,574 from Yugoslavia, 21,273 from Bulgaria. and 14,100 from Turkey. Id.
Of those who sought asylum during this period. Germany granted asylum to 11.7
percent of the applications from Turkey, 0.1% of those from Bulgaria. 4.1% of those
from Yugoslavia, and 0.1% of those from Romania. Id. The total number of applica-
tions to which Germany granted asylum was 5,130, or 2.1% of the total applications
asylum-seekers filed. Id In July 1993. Germany granted 1,623 persons asylum, or
3.3% of the total number of adjudications. Id. In August 1993. Germany granted
asylum to 1,903 persons, or 3.9% of the total number of applications it adjudicated.
Id
183. See supra notes 13-46 and 93-103 (describing the past refugee policies of the
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post-Cold War domestic political realignments make it extremely diffi-
cult for ruling parties in either country to mobilize support for continued
adherence to international refugee conventions." On the other hand,
unilateral closing of borders by Germany and the United States does
nothing to encourage multilateral strategies for accommodating the refu-
gee crisis. Politicians in both countries have argued that it is necessary
to limit the right to asylum in order to preserve it.'85 This section ar-
gues that, although some restrictions are unavoidable in the short-term,
long-term resolution of the crisis cannot depend on the subordination of
fundamental human rights to national self-interest. Instead, the United
States and Germany must seek global solutions that preserve the right to
asylum while allocating the costs of the refugee crisis in a more equita-
ble manner.
A. POINTS OF DEPARTURE-THE MODELS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
The germ of a system of "collective responsibility,"'86 or global bur-
den sharing of the asylum epidemic, is present in the asylum laws of
both Europe and the United States." 7 Three areas of German asylum
law could contribute to the establishment of a workable global asylum
processing structure while allocating the asylum burden across a broader
spectrum of countries. First, Germany's system of allocating asylum-
seekers among its states provides a proportional formula for sharing the
asylum burden-a formula any successful global system will need. 88
Second, Germany's negotiation of reciprocal agreements with Poland,
United States and Germany).
184. See supra notes 46, 134-39 (describing public pressure to restrict immigra-
tion).
185. See supra notes 29-46 and 104-32 and accompanying text (recounting political
rationales for limiting asylum).
186. The author uses the term "collective responsibility" to denote a recommenda-
tion for globalizing the present asylum framework of Germany and in the United
States. Under this globalized framework, more countries would share the burden of a
worldwide refugee epidemic.
187. See supra notes 77-79, 166-69 and accompanying text (discussing the United
States' reservation of the right to send refugees to other countries and Germany's
cooperative agreements with Poland. Hungary, and other European countries). See
generally Schengen Agreement, supra note 170 (implementing a cooperative effort
among EC nations to standardize border patrols and address the refugee issue).
188. See supra note 98 accompanying text (discussing Germany's method of allo-
cating asylum-seekers among its states).
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Romania, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and other EC nations exem-
plifies on a regional level the cooperative effort necessary for a global
system.'89 Finally, Germany has adjusted its asylum law to permit its
participation in the Schengen Agreement, thus broadening the range of
countries upon which it may rely in alleviating its disproportionate bur-
den.190
Aspects of United States asylum law also could contribute to a global
system of collective responsibility. Although in a less advanced stage,
the structure of United States asylum law also appears, at least tacitly,
to endorse global sharing of the asylum burden. For example, under its
present asylum law, the United States "reserves the right" to disperse
asylum-seekers to willing countries both before and after hearing their
cases.' 9' In addition, the United States has initiated cooperative agree-
ments with countries in its region both to restrict the flow of refu-
gees 92 and to share the burden of refugees apprehended in internation-
al waters.9
A system of collective responsibility" based on existing programs
189. See supra notes 164-75 and accompanying text (delineating reciprocal agree-
ments between Germany, former Eastern Block countries, and European Community
states).
190. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Schengen
Agreement principles).
191. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing United States res-
ervation of the right to send asylum-seekers to other countries).
192. See, e.g., Agreement on Interdiction of Haitian Immigration to the U.S., Sept.
23, 1981. U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559, 3559 [hereinafter 1981 Haitian Immigration
Agreement] (setting forth the terms of a cooperative agreement between the United
States and Haiti whereby the Haitian government agreed to assist the United States in
stopping the migration of refugees from Haiti to the United States); Roberto Suro.
U.S., Cuba Agree on Stemming Raft Tide, WASH. PosT., Sept. 10. 1994. at Al (re-
porting an accord between the United States and Cuba under which the United States
agreed to accept 20,000 Cuban refugees and Cuba promised to use all possible means
to prevent its citizens from seeking refuge in the United States).
193. See Ann Devroy, U.S. to Bar Haitians Picked Up at Sea. Other Countries to
Provide Temporary Havens, WASH. POST, July 6, 1994. at Al (reporting that Panama.
Dominica, and Antigua had agreed to accept Haitian refugees the United States inter-
dicted); Maria Puente, Few Countries Have Offered Safer Areas for Refugees. USA
TODAY, Aug. 30, 1994, at 2A (observing that the United States had been unable to
obtain firm agreements from most Caribbean countries it approached to accept Cuban
and Haitian refugees).
194. See, e.g., Eve B. Burton, Leasing Rights: A New International Instrument for
Protecting Refugees and Compensating Host Countries. 19 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L
REv. 307, 309 (proposing an instrument whereby the international community buys an
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in the United States and Germany would allow the international commu-
nity to reallocate the costs of the global asylum burden.'95 Although
"collective responsibility" would mandate international reform, it would
not require an entirely new system. As the United States and German
frameworks demonstrate, many of the components indispensable to a
successful program exist in national asylum laws. An international sys-
tem of collective responsibility would apply on a global scale the re-
gional strategies already in place throughout the world.'96
B. A FORMULA FOR COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
One possible formula for addressing the asylum problem would allo-
cate asylum-seekers throughout participating countries of the international
community,'97 under UNHCR supervision, 9 ' according to a percent-
age formula that tracks the population and resources of each coun-
try. ' This approach borrows elements from the 1982 Asylum Proce-
easement or a right of access to land refugees occupy in a host country). In consid-
eration for the payment, the host country would allow an international human rights
monitoring team unobstructed access to refugee populations within the country. Id.
195. See supra notes 164-75, 192 and accompanying text (discussing the regional
agreements in place in the United States and Germany).
196. See, e.g., 1981 Haitian Immigration Agreement, supra note 192, at 3559 (out-
lining a cooperative arrangement between the United States and Haiti); Schengen
Agreement, supra note 170 (promulgating a cooperative arrangement within the EC to
curtail illegal immigration activities in Europe). Collective responsibility would encour-
age the United States and Germany, for example, not only to conclude sound regional
agreements to address the refugee dilemma, but to expand the base of these agree-
ments beyond their own regions to include as many countries as possible. The United
States and Germany also could agree to cooperate on the refugee dilemma bilaterally.
197. See Political Asylum, supra note 8, at 229 n.157 (describing a global asylum
processing strategy proposed by Dale F. Swartz, President of the National Immigra-
tion, Refugee and Citizenship Forum, whereby "countries of first asylum would trans-
fer asylum-seekers to an international holding center" where international representa-
tives would adjudicate their claims). This strategy would resettle refugees in a country
which is not necessarily their country of first asylum. Id.
198. See Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 8, at 243-50 (stating that UNHCR in-
volvement in asylum processing coupled with a limited role for the State Department
would help depoliticize the asylum process); Forty Year Crisis, supra note 8, at 19
(recommending that the UNHCR issue advisory opinions and help clarify asylum stan-
dards and procedures); see also Clare Nullis, U.N. Agency to help Screen Haitians,
PHILA. INQUIRER, May 23, 1994, at A4 (reporting that the United Nations and the
United States reached an agreement whereby the UNHCR would "counsel Haitians,
train U.S. officials involved in refugee determination, monitor the overall process and
assist in seeking third country cooperation").
199. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the formula for allocat-
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dures Law in Germany,' the Schengen Agreement," the "reserva-
tion clauses" of United States legislation,' and the 1981 immigration
agreement between the United States and Haiti.' Although much de-
bate will ensue concerning the factors this international consortium
should use in determining the resources and population of each country,
the analysis should consider such factors as the Gross National Product
(GNP), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), budget deficits, and unemploy-
ment rates of the participating countries in reaching a decision as to
where to locate an asylum-seeker.
The goal of this analysis is to determine the ability of countries to
absorb refugees (their "absorption rate") in order more efficiently to
allocate the resources of a larger contingent of countries. For example, if
the UNHCR determines that the United States can absorb ten percent of
the projected number of refugees for a given year, then the United
States' obligation cannot exceed that amount. If twenty-five percent of
the world's refugees in that year apply for asylum at United States ports
of entry, then the United States, in consultation with the UNHCRI may
transfer the surplus to other countries that have failed to exhaust their
stipulated quota for the year. Because the "collective responsibility"
model presumes that true political asylum candidates concern themselves
first and foremost with safety, not the economic viability of a particular
country, it grants asylum-seekers minimal discretion in selecting their
ultimate destination. At the same time, the model recognizes the futility
of requiring a country to accept asylum-seekers for whom it is unable to
provide economically.
C. EXPEDITIOUS PROCESSING AND DETERRENCE OF FILINGS
A collective responsibility approach would accomplish two reforms
national legislation consistently pursues: expeditious processing of pend-
ing asylum-seekers among the various German states). The proportionate burden shar-
ing of collective responsibility mirrors Germany's domestic concept. Id.
200. See supra notes 145-75 and accompanying text (examining the German Asy-
lum Procedure Act of 1993).
201. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Schengen
Agreement's conceptual foundation).
202. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing the United States'
reservation of the right to seek assistance from other countries in administering its
asylum dilemma).
203. See 1981 Haitian Immigration Agreement. supra note 192, at 3559 (outlining
the cooperative immigration agreement between the United States and Haiti).
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ing claims,"M and reduction of new claims. 5 The collective responsi-
bility model would centralize the global asylum machinery"5 and di-
rect more resources to the problem, thereby expediting the processing of
asylum claims.' International regulation would reduce the number of
new claims in two ways. First, limiting applicants' discretion would
deter frivolous claims.' Second, collective responsibility moots fears
that the law will discourage legitimate candidates from applying for asy-
lum." 9 Because collective responsibility allocates claims on a percent-
age basis, it always provides a haven for legitimate candidates. The
international community must accommodate all claims under this model.
Although candidates for asylum will lose some freedom of choice, pres-
ervation of a guaranteed safe haven outweighs any loss in individual
discretion.
204. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to expe-
dite processing of asylum claims in the United States).
205. See Asylum PrQcedure Act of 1993, supra note 108, at art. 1 (implementing
Basic Law 16 of the Grundgesetz, as amended, to limit refugees' right to asylum);
see also Political Asylum, supra note 8, at 226 (stating that Germany and the United
States have enacted legislation which seeks to deter the filing of new asylum claims).
To deter the filing of new claims, Germany required visas, restricted work authoriza-
tion, instituted communal housing arrangements, and cut benefits. Id. The United
States program for interdiction of Haitians and restrictions on opportunities for asylum
applicants to work pending adjudication of their claims seek to deter the filing of
additional claims. Id. at 246-47.
206. See Haitian Boat People, supra note 40, at 336-37 (suggesting that the
Unites States work in close collaboration with the UNHCR in processing claims).
207. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. proposals to
direct increased resources to asylum processing).
208. See Political Asylum, supra note 8, at 233 (stating that short-term detention,
expeditious adjudication of cases, and improved border patrols will deter frivolous
claims). Expeditious processing will diminish the expectations of aliens looking to buy
time with the filing of a frivolous claim and may deter those with frivolous claims
from leaving their homeland in the first place. Id. But see id. at 230 (arguing that at-
tempts to distinguish "economic" from "political" refugees often have the effect of
denying legitimate claims).
209. See id. at 230 (stating that the troublesome aspect of programs that seek to
deter the filing of claims is that they may deter the filing of bona fide claims). The
challenge is to create a system which creates disincentives large enough to deter
frivolous claims, but not to deter legitimate claims. Id.
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D. THE FAMILY MEMBER DILEMIA
Under collective responsibility, the location of family members would
become a factor only after the candidate had established a legitimate
claim for asylum.21 Processing officials would first determine the mer-
its of the claim. Once the candidate had won asylum, the residence of
family members would become a factor in determining the candidate's
country of asylum.2 ' If the asylum-seeker had an immediate family
relationship to any individual in the country in which the claim was
filed, the asylum-seeker would gain entry to that country." ' Further-
more, any persons under eighteen years of age or persons who could
demonstrate an unequivocal dependence on the family member would
gain entry after establishing a legitimate claim to political persecu-
tion.2
13
210. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community
Ties": A Response to Martin, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 237 (1983) (discussing the lack of
constitutional protection for immigrants trying to enter a country to reunite with fami-
ly members). The United States applies stricter scrutiny in exclusion decisions (pre-
venting aliens' entry into the United States) than in deportation decisions (removing
aliens residing in the United States). Id. Historically, an individual to whom a country
grants asylum gains admission to that country. Id. See infra notes 210-15 and accom-
panying text (explaining that a collective responsibility program, which attempts to
create safe havens for all legitimate candidates, would only guarantee admission to
immediate family members, minors, and persons dependent for other documented rea-
sons).
211. See Hartmut Esser & Herman Korte, Federal Republic of Germany, in EURO-
PEAN IMMIGRATION PoLicy: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 165, 173-74 (Tomas Hammar
ed., 1985) (stating that since the Bundestag stopped recruiting foreign workers in
1973, family reunification has become a source of increased immigration); see also
John Guendelsberger, Implementing Family Unification Rights in American Immigration
Law: Proposed Amendments, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 253. 276 (stating that reuniting
members of the immediate family should be a constitutional right); Neuman. supra
note 97, at 57-63 (discussing entry for the purpose of reuniting families in Germa-
ny).
212. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)
(holding that any procedure Congress authorizes constitutes due process for aliens the
United States denies entry). In Knauff, the United States denied entry to the German
wife of an American soldier. ld. See also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953) (affirming the twenty-one-month detention and denial of re-entry
of a permanent resident alien).
213. See Guendelsberger, supra note 211, at 258 (discussing the admission of mi-
nors for family reunification purposes); see also Kay Hailbronner, Citizenship and
Nationhood in Germany, 70-71 in IMMIaRATrON AND T"IE PoLmes op CrTZEnNsinp IN
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Collective responsibility would not guarantee legitimate candidates
entry to countries where they lack immediate family members. Rather,
candidates would have the burden of making out a case for admission to
a particular country based on specific circumstances" 4 before an inter-
national review board." 5 Depending on the merit of the argument and
absorption rate of the country at the time the asylum-seeker files the
claim, the board would have discretion to grant admission. This process
would not deter a refugee whose motive is to escape persecution by
gaining entry to any safe haven.
E. METHODS FOR SUBSIDIZING-THE "POOLED FUND"
A "pooled fund," to which the participating parties contribute a per-
centage equal to their absorption rate for a given year, funds this collec-
tive responsibility structure.1 If the total cost of processing and trans-
EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA (W. Brubaker ed., 1989) (discussing chain migration as
it relates to children and spouses of first generation and second generation resident
aliens). To limit family reunification, the federal administration of Germany denies
first-time resident permits to spouses of second generation resident aliens unless the
spouse has been married for at least one year, has reached the age of eighteen, and
has lived continuously in Germany for eight months. Id.
214. See Neuman, supra note 97, at 59 (discussing the various restrictions on the
admission of family members in Germany, the most common of which is a one-year
waiting period for second generation resident aliens and eight years of residence); see
also Social Group, supra note 93, at 396-437 (emphasizing the importance of consid-
ering ethnicity when making asylum determinations). Collective responsibility would
consider the persecution of various ethnic groups before providing an asylum-seeker
with a safe haven.
215. See generally Political Asylum, supra note 8 (discussing the importance of
adequate processing agencies and review boards). Beyond the INS and EOIR, which,
in conjunction with the UNHCR, would remain in place as the bodies that initially
hear asylum claims, this collective responsibility program would establish at least two
review boards. The first board would review individual asylum decisions on appeal
and determine family reunification claims. Members from the host country as well as
the UNHCR would comprise this board. The collective responsibility model would
entrust dispute resolution between participating countries to a second board. Represen-
tatives from all participating countries would serve on this board, along with UNHCR
members. Aside from these two review boards, collective responsibility participants
would form a committee to determine the "absorption rate" of participating countries
and to determine in which safe haven legitimate asylum candidates would ultimately
receive refuge. At least one member from all participating countries as well as mem-
bers from the UNHCR, like the dispute resolution board, would comprise this board.
216. Under this proposal each country would have to expend resources in propor-
tion to its "absorption rate" for the year.
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porting asylum-seekers in a given year is $5 billion and the United
States absorption rate is ten percent, then the United States would con-
tribute $500 million to the pooled fund. Although this system would
require significant financial outlays, countries could expect a streamlined
approach to asylum processing to reduce overall costs."7
An internationally centralized program would reduce costs by expedit-
ing claims.2 8 Delays in processing applications and adjudicating ap-
peals contribute significantly to the expense of present asylum sys-
tems.219 A global approach to immigration with clearly defined criteria
for granting asylum could effect savings by decreasing the amount of
adjudication. Furthermore, contributors to the pooled fund would recoup
a portion of such expenditures because of a decreased need for border
patrols.' Finally, collective responsibility may seem particularly ap-
pealing to politicians who must remain accountable to their constituen-
cies. By placing the responsibility for determining each country's asylum
burden on an international body, politicians would be able to accept a
fair number of immigrants while reducing political backlash. 2 The
United States and Germany would almost certainly agree to assume the
lead role in such a program because it would lessen their burdens sig-
nificantly. The participation of these major powers should motivate
countries that now carry only a proportional share of the refugee burden,
and thus would not feel an adverse impact from collective responsibili-
ty.2
Those countries who currently pay less than their share would also
have some incentive to participate. Although their short-term costs might
increase, such countries might prefer the predictability and fairness of a
217. See generally Legal Norms, supra note 30 (recommending a streamlined ap-
proach to asylum processing); Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 8 (emphasizing the need
for an orderly approach to asylum adjudication).
218. See supra notes 66-76, 153-59 and accompanying text (discussing means of
expediting processing of asylum claims).
219. See, e.g., supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (delineating the costs
associated with delays in asylum adjudication in Germany).
220. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed in-
creases in resource allocation for border patrols in the United States).
221. See J.F.O. McAllister Washington, Lives on Hold, TMTi, Feb. 1, 1993. at 50
(stating that the Clinton Administration desires to implement an asylum program that
achieves the proper balance between affording asylum to legitimate candidates and
protecting the interests of United States citizens).
222. See generally Political Asylum, supra note 8 (emphasizing the importance of
the United States and Germany in the development of a global asylum policy).
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global allocation mechanism to the risks of an unregulated asylum sys-
tem.m Participation in a system of collective responsibility offers op-
portunities to accumulate the goodwill of the major powers; while refus-
al to participate encourages ostracism. Countries could channel the glob-
al savings resulting from a more efficient asylum system into a fund to
provide adjustment assistance to participants that increase their refugee
costs by entering into the system of collective responsibility. 4 Finally,
the allocation mechanism could distribute well-educated refugees, who
under an unregulated system would probably choose industrialized coun-
tries, to countries with particular needs for their skills. By promoting
both equity and efficiency, the "pooled fund" would fulfill collective
responsibility's primary goal of preserving the right to asylum for legiti-
mate claimants.'
F. REALIsTc LIMITATIONS ON ENFORCEMENT
Domestic compliance is the most important element to the success of
such a program, and admittedly, the most difficult to satisfy." 6 Al-
though it appears the motives exist for the United States and Germany
to participate in collective responsibility,' the model's success de-
pends on these countries' collaboration. Collective responsibility poses
no fundamental threat to sovereignty. Although the UNHCR's powers
would increase, collective responsibility would compel no state to coop-
erate, and each state would participate substantially in all decisions in
which it had a stake. Each state would have input in the collective
determination of its absorption rate and the identification of asylees for
which it would function as a safe haven. Participating states would share
223. See generally Social Group, supra note 93 (articulating the need for an equi-
table distribution of asylum costs).
224. See Political Asylum, supra note 8, at 226-41 (suggesting that increases in
spending on the asylum dilemma could lead to long-term efficiency and savings).
225. See generally Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 8 (emphasizing the importance
of preserving asylum rights for legitimate applicants).
226. See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. recognition of
the jus cogens norm of non-refoulement and its seemingly contradictory domestic poli-
cy, which includes designing programs to deter asylum applications and interdiction of
certain refugee groups at sea without inquiry as to whether or not they have a well-
founded fear of persecution).
227. See supra notes 186-225 and accompanying text (elaborating on the incentive
for the United States and Germany to participate in collective responsibility).
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decision-making responsibility with specially trained UNHCR employees
and representatives from other participating countries.m
Collective responsibility would allow participating countries to main-
tain their present immigration agencies. The United States, for example,
could continue to use the INS and the EOIR as its representatives in
asylum processing, assuming Congress approves increased funding for
personnel and training. UNHCR representatives would act as liaisons
between the INS and EOIR and the other signatories to the agreement.
Ideally, UNHCR involvement would centralize and coordinate asylum
administration. Furthermore, UNHCR presence would diminish the State
Department's role in the asylum system, thus depoliticizing the pro-
cess. 9 Although some may criticize the United Nation's oversight
ability due to its often excessively bureaucratic management style, others
believe that, despite these drawbacks, the United Nations has far more
experience and expertise in the global management and implementation
of refugee policies than each of its member nations respectively.
Finally, dispute resolution for disagreements concerning determinations
on refugee receipts and contributions to the pooled fund would provide
a forum for a country dissatisfied with the process. Countries could
appeal these disagreements to an international committee, similar to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ),m comprising representatives of
each participating country and the UNHCR."' Although politics would
inevitably affect this body's decisions, ' - representation from all partici-
pating countries and the UNHCR would provide a fair opportunity to
develop consensus."
228. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing the composition of the
various processing and review boards under collective responsibility).
229. See Legal Norms, supra note 30. at 454-56 (suggesting the need to decrease
the State Department's role in asylum adjudication); see also Political Asylum. supra
note 8, at 235-36 (recommending the abolition of State Department involvement in
asylum processing).
230. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 21. at art. IV (stipulating that the IC has
jurisdiction to resolve disputes between member parties).
231. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (delineating dispute resolution
board composition).
232. See Political Asylum. supra note 8. at 240 (noting that the idea that countries
can create institutions to apply universally shared public interest concepts has existed
for years). Unfortunately, real world operations deny most of this fantasy. Id. The
interests independent bodies regulate often overwhelm the regulatory entities. Id.
233. See Burton, supra note 194, at 319-32 (proposing a leasing arrangement for
refugees between an international community and a host country). Based on such
proposals, it is conceivable that collective responsibility could develop into a system
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CONCLUSION
The end of the Cold War has accelerated migration across the bound-
aries of once-polarized nations.' As the evaporating right to political
asylum in the United States and Germany indicates, this new found
mobility on behalf of much of the world's populace, combined with
economic strife across the globe, has generated great concern. 5 The
asylum laws of the United States and Germany, which originate in post
World War II democratic and humanitarian sentiments, can no longer ef-
fectively protect the internationally recognized rights of political refu-
gees. 6 Countries are revising their asylum laws and limiting the rights
of asylum-seekers in the process. 7
For asylum to survive as a viable remedy for legitimate political
refugees, a substantial part of the international community must increase
its share of the refugee burden. At the same time, participating countries
in a global asylum program must implement restrictions, such as limit-
ing the extent to which a refugee can choose his or her safe haven.
Such restrictions would reduce the number of frivolous applications and
contribute to preserving the system for legitimate claims.
The success of this globalized movement, undoubtedly, will depend
upon increased resources and better trained officials. As the United
States and Germany have carried a large share of the burden, their in-
which accommodates one country paying another country to receive refugees and
applying the number of refugees sold against that country's "absorption rate." It is
conceivable that if international efforts addressing the refugee dilemma are successful,
the international community could provide this foundation for a much wider range of
activity in this area.
234. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing the increase in global
mobility).
235. See Ricou Heaton, The European Community After 1992: The Freedom of
Movement of People and Its Limitations, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 643, 646-54
(1992) (stating that EC members remain concerned about the potential derogatory
effect on EC asylum programs migration from former communist countries).
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sight is both invaluable and necessary. Together with a willing interna-
tional community, these two nations can succeed in preserving the right
to asylum for legitimate claimants, or remain inactive and witness its
erosion. The necessary tooIs exist within existing national asylum pro-
grams. Nations must now use them to forge a global approach to asy-
lum reform.
